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INCOME TAX LAW AND REGULATIONS AFFECTING AGRICULTURE 
Charles Davenport 
Professor of Law 
University of California, Davis 
As one of the few lawyers at this seminar I feel a little like Daniel 
in the lions· den and I hope others here will restrain themselves as well 
as the lions did. There are some advantages in being first on the program, 
as you may have forgotten my talk by the time the session is over. 
We are here to talk about the tax law governing agricultural invest-
ment. Generally speaking, there are two methods by which farmers may re-
port their income taxes. One is the so-called farmer cash method. Its 
most important feature is that inventories of goods on hand need not be 
reported in the calculation of income. Income and expense are, as a rule, 
taken into account when received or paid. The cash method does not convert 
capital expenditures into immediately deductible expenses. For instance, 
land, buildings, and other similar expenditures are not affected by the 
provision. 
The accrual method, the second choice, is different from the cash 
method in several significant respects. Under it, income is realized when 
the right to receive the account is fixed. This is essentially when a 
sale is made, even though the cash may not be in hand. Likewise, an ex-
pense is deducted when the obligation is fixed -- when the fact and the 
amount are fairly well fixed. However, the most significant difference is 
that some sort of inventory is required. For farm tax reporting, the in-
ventory under the accrual system is handled slightly differently from com-
mercial accounting. The ending inventory is added to income received during 
the year, and beginning inventory is subtracted. Thus, inventory values 
are adjustments to income. This differs from commercial accounting where 
the ending inventory is subtracted from expenses, and the beginning in-
ventory is added to expenses. In other words, in general commercial ac-
counting inventory values are functions of expenses rather than income. 
The difference has entered into some important court decisions but are not 
important for purposes of this seminar. 
Other methods of accounting are available to farmers. I doubt anyone 
here is interested in the crop method, because it applies only to pine-
apples and sugar cane crops that require more than one year to grow. Other, 
hybrid, methods need not detain us. 
Pre-productive Stage Expenses 
Those are the accounting methods. In addition, there is a concept in 
the tax law of IIpre-productive stage ll expenses. The farming cycle is 
basically divided by the Internal Revenue Service into three periods. The 
first is the preparation period -- everything that occurs before the land 
is ready to be planted. Then there may be a so-called development, or 
pre-productive stage. You find that with perennial bush and tree crops 
that produce an annual crop: Orchards, vineyards, things of that nature. 
From the time the plant is in the ground until it produces a commercial 
crop is the pre-productive or development period. The IRS as long ago as 
1918 held that those expenses could be deducted. Except for citrus and 
almond orchards since 1969 and 1970, pre-productive expenses have been 
deductible at the election of the taxpayer. This option differs from most 
commercial accounting where comparable kinds of expenditures would be 
capitalized and amortized or written off at some future time. In the case 
of herds and flocks there is a question whether or when there is a true 
pre-productive stage. If an individual starts to raise cattle, knowing that 
it will take five years to build the herd up to the break-even point, the 
five year period would be the pre-productive stage. 
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A few cases have held that the pre-productive expenses of a herd may 
be deducted. The difficulty for livestock is that, unlike fruit and nut 
crops, the line between the pre-productive stage and the production stage 
that follows is very difficult to draw and may vary from time to time and 
from place to place. 
Once the pre-productive stage is over, whether it be animal or plant, 
most expenses are deductible. The important line is between the prepara-
tion and pre-productive periods. Because expenses that fall into the pre-
paration period must be capitalized, shrewd taxpayers try to push the pre-
productive stage back as far as possible. 
There are a couple of very interesting court cases, one successful, and 
one unsuccessful. The first involved citrus prior to 1969, when pre-product-
ive expenses could be deducted. In order to raise a viable orange tree 
from seed, the top must be bent over and a bud must be placed at the top. 
The tree may be taken out of the nursery and planted in an orchard only 
after additional growth. A shrewd taxpayer found the cost of buying a bud-
ded tree ready to plant in the orchard to be $2.75. He then asked a nursery-
man what he would charge for a seedling which would grow -- in effect the 
seed in the ground -- which would then be budded and grown in the nursery 
until ready for planting in his orchard. Finding it to be 30 cents he told 
the nurseryman that he would buy the seedlings from him. Although the man 
did not take possession of the little trees, he deducted all costs in ex-
cess of 30 cents. The Government had shown that there was a market only in 
trees valued at $2.75 that were ready to plant in the orchard, and none in 
seedlings. The question was whether the man could deduct costs incurred 
from the time the seedling was planted until it was moved to the orchard. 
Was that period a preparation period or a pre-productive period? 
The Tax Court, and finally the Ninth Circuit held that he could make 
the deduction. He had to capitalize only 30 cents per tree, and the $2.45 
difference was deductible over the years. 
In another case on exactly the same point, decided in Illinois where 
there is no citrus, the court did not reach the same conclusion. 
Within the last two weeks there has been a case in which a farmer-tax-
payer willing to pay $330 for a milk cow worked out a deal with his supplier 
of cattle under which he would purportedly pay $28 for a calf. The other 
$302 would be raising costs. His hope was to capitalize the $28 and deduct 
the $302. However, he in effect had a guarantee that he would get either 
a milking cow or his $330 back. Because he had no risk of loss he lost his 
deduction of $302. 
The first case is a how-to-do-it case, and the second a how-not-to-do-
it instance. The essential difference was that the first man took the risk 
of loss, but the second was not willing to take that risk. Somewhere in 
between these two extremes are insurance programs. A few years ago a cattle 
breeding and feeding prospectus was put out in California that had a life 
insurance program for cattle. The name of this life insurance program was 
"Lucky stiff" and presumably if one were to take the risk of loss, but in-
sure with Lucky Stiff, both the cost of the insurance and the raising cost 
of cattle would become deductible. 
The concept of pre-productive expenses applies whether or not the tax-
payer is using cash or accrual accounting. It just does not make any dif-
ference. In this a number of people make a mistake. The taxpayer does not 
have to be on the cash method in order to make use of pre-productive de-
ductions. 
The consequence of the pre-productive concept is to permit both cash 
and accrual taxpayers to deduct expenditures which clearly under prior case 
law and generally accepted accounting principles are capital expenditures. 
This is especially true regarding growing plants. The treatment of herds 
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and floc~s is not so clear. An accrual-basis livestock farmer will have to 
tak7 an lnventory, and if this is done, even during the pre-productive 
perlod, the benefit of deducting the pre-productive expenses will be lost. 
If a taxpayer is on the accrual method two problems arise in taking 
inventories. First, the product must be counted or measured and that may 
be difficult. Second, the product must be valued. ' 
There are four methods of valuing farm inventories. One is to use 
,?ost, but the ~sce~tc:-inm~nt of cost may be difficult, and this difficulty 
lS one of the Justlflcatlons offered for the excusing of inventories if 
the farmer so chooses. The second method is the lower of cost or market 
value. Obviously, if cost cannot be determined, this method may not be 
used. 
The third method is the farm price method which values inventories 
at disposition value less direct costs of disposal. This method is generally 
considered objectionable because if there is any unrealized appreciation in 
those things that are counted, it results in incorporating that appreciation 
as income. Remember that the inventory value will be added to income, so 
that if you buy a cow at $100 and put $200 worth of feed in her, but she 
has a $400 value, the difference between the $300 total cost and the $400 
value would be taken into income if the farm price method is used. Of 
course, you don't have the cash; all you have is the cow. Consequently, 
the farm price method is not used very widely. 
Most livestock producers, if they are on an inventory method, use the 
unit livestock method. In this one puts all cattle into certain age cate-
gories -- yearlings, two-year-olds, three-year-olds, milking cows, breeding 
cows, that sort of thing. Each classification is then arbitrarily valued 
at estimated cost when the inventory is first established. A one-year-old 
would have one value; a two-year-old would have another value; and that's 
the inventory value. 
There are several problems with this method of inventory. First of 
all, in order to change the value that is assigned to a particular classifi-
cation of animals, one must have permission of the Commissioner of Internal . 
Revenue. Normally that permission is not easily or quickly given, and if 
values are fluctuating, that~ obviously not a very satisfactory answer. 
In this inventory one must also include all raised livestock, even 
though not held for sale. Thus draft and breeding animals, if raised, must 
be included. This has opened up an interesting question with respect to 
those animals, namely, whether or not they are depreciable. A lot of people 
say, "Yes, they are depreciable. 1I I do not know the answer to that, be-
cause I've looked at authoritative sources which indicate that if draft and 
breeding animals -- and now I guess sporting animals as well -- are in a 
unit livestock inventory the unit livestock value itself takes deprecia-
tion into account. If so, there is no separate depreciation deduction. 
In other words, the value itself is supposed to account for depreciation. 
Under the unit livestock method, if animals are not specifically 
identified, the first-in-first-out method is used. That led to the Auburn 
Packing case where the taxpayer was a cattle feeder. There is a rule under 
the unit livestock method which holds that if cattle are bought during the 
first part of the year and add value during the year,afull year's growth 
or value is added. In other words, if you buy cows on June 29th and you 
add $100 for the year's increase in value, even though you held the cow 
only part of the year, you still add that $100 to your inventory at the 
end of the year. The corollary of that is if you buy an animal in the 
second half of the year, nothing is added for any increment in value. In 
the Auburn Packing case, the cattle feeder had an inventory at the end of 
the year that was smaller than his purchases in the second half. When 
that fact was put together with the first-in-first-out rule, the taxpayer 
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was allowed to deduct all of his raising cost, even though he had in his 
inventory a number of animals which had been purchased in the first part of 
the year to which he should have had to add increments of value. 
The government argued that first-in-first-out accounting could not be 
used by a cattle feeder in the unit livestock method. It is interesting 
because that is the second case which seems specifically to hold that a 
cattle feeder is a farmer. Back in the 1930's the Tax Court had taken a 
different view and said that such taxpayers were not farmers. More recently 
the authorities hold to the contrary. 
Prepayment of Expenses in Cash Accounting 
I will shift now and go back to the cash method of accounting and pre-
paid expenses. Prepaid expenses have -- if you will -- helped the tax 
shelter world go round. There are several kinds of expenses which might be 
prepaid, and the law differs from expense to expense. I want to run 
through a few of these. 
The first is interest. Prior to 1968, everyone thought interest could 
be prepaid for at least five years' time and a deduction taken for it. Due 
to a number of fantastic real estate deals which the Treasury defined as 
abuses, in 1968 the Treasury held that prepaid interest could not be de-
ducted by a cash basis taxpayer for any period that extended more than 12 
months beyond the end of the year in which the payment was made. In other 
words, you could make a payment in 1974 that would permit a deduction that 
would cover 1974 and 1975, and you could get a deduction for it. But if 
you made a payment for 1974, 1975, and 1976, the whole amount had to be pro-
rated to the various periods. That ruling was attacked severely, but the 
committee reports accompanying the 1969 Tax Reform Act say that the ruling 
was accurate. The Tax Court concurred as recently as 1974, when it held 
that the ruling was valid and proper as applied to the facts of the case 
before it. 
with regard to labor and services, management services in a cattle 
feeding operation for example, quite a number of cases deny deductions 
for prepayments of management services -- say of payments made in December 
1974 for all of 1975. These cases include accrual-basis taxpayers as well 
as cash-basis ones. Despite the fact that the law appeared quite clear, 
in two 1971 rulings the IRS held that the prepayment of services in an oil 
drilling contract could be deducted in the year of payment. It is a most 
interesting ruling because there is literally no case law, except one case 
which the Federal District Court in California decided in 1954, that had 
ever permitted such a deduction, but quite a lot of case law to the con-
trary. Consequently, deductibility of prepayments of labor and services 
is up in the air now. I do not see the difference between fattening a calf 
and drilling an oil well. 
Next is the question of feed and supplies. In many of the syndicated 
cattle feeding operations -- I focus more on feeding than breeding 
the juice, if I may put it that way, in them was to buy feed right at the 
end of the year and deduct it against the current year income, and then 
feed the feed to the cattle the following year. The income would be realized 
when the cattle were sold. In late 1973, after a couple of years of hem-
ming and hawing, the IRS finally issued a ruling holding that there would 
be no more deduction for prepaid feed and supplies where such deduction re-
sulted in a material distortion of income. That is basically the same test 
that was set out on the prepaid interest ruling. A group, in Oklahoma I 
believe, sued the IRS to enjoin the enforcement of that ruling. The District 
Court granted the injunction, but the 10th Circuit annulled the injunction. 
So I take it that the IRS is now at least free to question deductions for 
prepaid fees and supplies. If there is a material distortion of income, 
the feed and supplies may be deducted only as fed. 
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In other expenses, such as rent, insurance, and the like, there's no 
question but that prepayments either by an accrual basis or cash basis 
taxpayer must be capitalized and amortized only as they are used up. 
In addition to these prepaid expenses, there are a number of other 
opportunities by which, in effect, to write off capital expenditures. I am 
sure you are familiar with soil and conservation expenses under Section 
175 of the Code, fertilizer expenses under section 180, and land clearing 
expenses under Section 182. I will not dwell on those. All have their 
peculiar limitations and qualifications. 
Capital Gain 
The next aspect of agricultural tax laws is that of capital gain. 
certain kinds of assets fall into section 1231 of the Code. Under that 
Section, if everything that goes in results in a net gain, then everything 
is treated as long-term capital gain. On the other hand, if everything 
that goes in results in a net loss, everything is treated as ordinary in-
come, giving an ordinary loss deduction for the net. Sale of livestock 
and many other farm assets falls under Section 1231. In a tax shelter 
operation, we would be concerned with livestock and with farms, vineyards, 
orchards, that kind of thing. They would fall within Section 1231. In 
order to have an animal in Section 1231 and obtain long-term capital gain 
on it, one must hold it for a period different from other assets. Usually 
one obtains capital gain by holding an asset for six months and one day. 
But for livestock generally one must hold the asset 12 months. For cattle 
and horses the holding period is 24 months. That raises an interesting 
definitional problem: what do you do with a mule? a beefalo that is 19/32 
beef and 13/32 buffalo? If the animal has been held more than one but 
less than two years, maybe the gain is 19/32 ordinary and 13/32 capital 
gain. I do not know the answer to that question. You might also like to 
know that mink are livestock and that turkeys, chickens, frogs and snakes 
are not. 
Generally that was the way the law stood prior to 1969. While Congress 
did a lot of things in the 1969 law I am not sure it changed the law very 
much. All it did was make it more complex by a seven step program. The 
first step was to establish something known as an excess deductions account. 
If a taxpayer had nonfarm income in excess of $50,000 and also a "farm loss" 
in excess of $25,000, the taxpayer was required to keep something called an 
excess deductions account for the amount by which the farm loss exceeded 
$25,000. Thereafter, upon sale of an asset which ordinarily produced capi-
tal gain, e.g., breeding livestock, a race horse, or a mink, the gain would 
be converted to ordinary income to the extent of the amount in the EDA. 
This provision is an incredibly complex piece of legislation; all kinds of 
exceptions are made for various kinds of transactions. It is a very diffi-
cult concept to enforce and indeed I doubt it can be enforced uniformly. 
The purpose was to limit capital gain on farm assets. It did not apply to 
more than three or four thousand farmers. When you consider there are some 
three million farm returns, you can see it does not apply to a large per-
centage. 
There was also a provision that generally provided for recapture 
of soil and water conservation expenses; that is the Section 175 deductions 
and the like where the land has not been held 10 years at the time of sale. 
There was also a recapture of depreciation on livestock. If livestock 
had been depreciated, any gain on the sale, to the extent of the deprecia-
tion, will be treated as ordinary income. The present holding periods for 
livestock were established. Previously the period had been a year for 
everything and it was changed to 24 months for cattle and horses and 12 
months for other livestock. 
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There is a provision which eliminates tax on like-kind exchange (prop-
erty for like-kind property) and Congress was concerned about trading 
heifers for steers and the like, and specifically said that it was not a 
like-kind exchange. 
Also in 1969 the capitalization of development costs of citrus groves 
was required for the first four years of the pre-productive period. In 
1970 that provision was expandedto include almonds. 
section 270 relating to hobby losses was repealed. It was repealed 
because it was a very difficult provision to apply and indeed applied only 
in a very capricious and arbitrary way to those who were not well enough 
advised to know how to avoid it. Section 183 was enacted in its place. 
Section 183 deals with something called activities not carried on for a 
profit and if one happens to fall into that unhappy category he may deduct 
the expenses of that activity only to the extent of his income from it. 
There are certain priorities about the way expenses are taken and applied 
against them first. 
That, generally speaking, is where we stand today. Let me close by 
telling you that the estimated cost of these deviations from general com-
mercial accounting result in lost revenue to the Treasury of about 
$900,000,000 per year, which is a very substantial revenue loss. 
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HOW LARGE FARMING OPERATIONS USE 
TAX-INFLUENCED INVESTMENT 
Willard F. Williams, Horn Professor 
Texas Tech University 
My remarks, as will be observed, will not conform exactly to the title. 
My approa7h appears ~ustifi~d. In,the first place, my experience with tax in-
fluenced 1~ves~ent 1S conf1ned ma1nly to commercial cattle feeding operations. 
In connect1o~ ~1th them I have conducted a number of investigations referred 
to as "due d1l1gence studies." These were authorized by representatives of 
the investors with full cooperation of the cattle feeding firms. I therefore 
have had an opportunity to inquire into all aspects of the management and use 
of public funds by such firms, but I am not familiar with practices of others. 
Secondly, the issues at firm and industry levels are much broader than 
the question of how the funds are used. There is a question of need. In 
fact, the more basic questions are, "Who will finance agriculture and closely 
related industries and how shall it be accomplished?" I address myself first 
to these questions. 
The Need for Public Financing 
In approaching the subject matter of this seminar we need to recognize 
the radical changes taking place in agriculture during the early 1970's. 
Nearly everything that marked the farm policy scene since the 1930 l s has 
changed. Some of the changes are temporary, but others are more lasting. 
Question has even arisen as to whether any large scale feedlots or public 
cattle feeding funds would remain in existence by the time of this seminar. 
In addition, we are now presented with the question of how productive 
U. S. agriculture really is. Considering the tighter supplies of mineral raw 
materials, what is its true capacity? There also is the question of organiza-
tional or structural effects on the nation1s agriculture. 
In my view, and here I begin to expose some of my biases, the trend to-
ward fewer, larger and more commercialized and industrialized operations in 
agriculture will continue. This trend along with more vertical integration 
will be accelerated. I believe this does not necessarily imply the early dis-
appearance of the typical Corn Belt farmer. Here as elsewhere, the smaller 
scale farmer will be a part of the American farm scene for many decades and, 
perhaps, indefinitely. Definitions of the word "typical," however, will 
change and the basic underlying trends toward larger-scale corporate agricul-
ture, despite recent reverses, will continue. These trends probably will 
accelerate as the corporate structure gradually adapts itself to agriculture. 
Consider the cattle feeding industry. As you know, events of 1974 de-
livered a staggering blow to cattle feeders but especially to the commercial 
custom cattle feeding sector. One of the great things about the agriculture 
of this nation, however, is that adversity always seems to generate new ideas, 
new thinking, and startling new directions. In the past month, I have heard 
of more new or revised ideas about cattle feeding than during the previous two 
or three years. Many of these center on products, ranging from guar to 
pumpkins, that might substitute for more expensive feed ingredients. Others, 
emanating from both agriculture and financially interested outside sources, 
are concerned with new organizational structures for production, marketing, 
and feeding. Producing more exclusively for particular markets, ~ontracting, 
hedging and revised methods of financing are receiving new attent10n. 
Many aspects of the current structure of the cattle feeding industrr 
developed out of adversity. custom feedlots, for example, are not an acc1dent. 
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They arose out of the depressed conditions of 1963-64 in answer to serious 
questions about who would own the cattle on feed and who would share the risks. 
Larger scale feedlots developed in the search for efficiency, product control 
and organization. However, even before the onset of recent economic problems 
it was clear that this was not enough. Cattle feeders, and in fact much of 
agriculture, have found it necessary to reach out for the expertise and the 
business management principles typical of incorporated nonfarm business organi-
zations. 
Results have been most interesting. In numerous situations, the philos-
ophy and practices of conventional cattlemen and those of corporate executives 
from outside agriculture have mixed like oil and water. An example or two may 
be appropriate. The original board of one large horizontally and vertically 
integrated firm, engaged mainly in cattle feeding, consisted almost exclusive-
ly of cattlemen. The first president was a man who had developed from a cow-
boy in one of the yards to feedlot manager and part owner. Each original 
director in this firm still manages a particular feedlot or other entity of the 
company more or less independently and apart from business activities of the 
central organization. Many serious business mistakes were made in the early 
life of the firm. Partly as a result, it was found necessary to replace the 
president with a man possessing more experience in business and finance. Addi-
tional directors were appointed and, interestingly, each of these was from 
outside agriculture or had considerable non-agricultural business experience. 
Top management remains relatively weak but as the influence of the original 
agriculturalist stockholders wanes, it will strengthen. 
Another well-known conglomerate operates cattle feeding activities from 
the top down. The chairman of the board and the president are professional 
corporate managers rather than agriculturalists. As a result, feedlot managers 
and other persons with agricultural backgrounds and typical cattle industry 
philosophy have disappeared from the scene. They have been replaced by young 
college graduates with good technical training but little experience. Again 
many mistakes have been made, but in this case modern business training is 
there and, these days, experience is being acquired rapidly. New ideas and 
directions are emerging from the new, aggressive management of this firm. 
The cattle industry, I am convinced, will emerge larger and stronger than 
before from the depressed conditions that are likely to continue over the next 
two years. Cattle feeding is here to stay and will recover to a more vigorous 
condition than ever but perhaps in dramatically changed form. 
To a large extent the name of the game today is IIcapital management. II 
By this I mean the development of a sufficiently large and flexible capital 
base, with assured financing, that the firm is able to live comfortably through, 
bad times until good times return. 
The capital requirements of cattle production and feeding are such that 
relatively large organizations are required. During 1968-73, internal sources 
of financing for development and growth of the cattle feeding industry in 
line with apparent consumer requirements became inadequate. The necessary 
funds simply were not available within agricultural circles. Public funds be-
came essential. These were acquired through the public sale of stock, private 
partnership arrangements with wealthy individuals outside agriculture, special 
Subchapter S corporations, and limited partnerships. Tax shelter aspects of 
some of these avenues of investment, while secondary to the principal require-
ment for outside financing, helped inuneasurably to attract funds to cattle 
feeding. 
When the ravages of the current severe liquidation phase of the cattle 
cycle are finished, a new and massive infusion of capital to the industry will 
be required. Agriculture still is our largest industry and appears destined 
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for labeling as the growth industry of the 1970's. Unless crop and livestock 
producers, individually or through their organizations, are able to provide 
the necessary capital for growth, it will be forthcoming from outside sources. 
This will mean backward integration by meat packers, processors, food com-
panies or others into cattle feeding and ultimately into farm or ranch produc-
tion. Already there is evidence of new moves in this direction. It is the 
outsiders, basically, that are beginning to recognize emerging opportunities 
within various sectors of the cattle industry. And this interest is not con-
fined to cattle. The fences between the cattle industry, or agriculture in 
general, and other sectors of the economy may recede further. 
As another example, a meat packing and food processing firm with which 
I am currently working has acquired one of our larger Texas panhandle feed-
lots. Home base of the firm is one of the larger eastern Corn Belt cities. 
The feedlot, with capacity for 45,000 head, currently is feeding 12,000. Prior 
to the onset of recent adversity ownership fell into the hands of the meat and 
food processing firm. This resulted from managerial and financial problems 
under ownership by cattle-oriented stockholders and managers. 
The optimism evident throughout this firm is surprlslng and refreshing. 
Progressive ideas are mainly responsible and these are emanating not from the 
feedlot sector but from top management in the East. The feedlot will be 
filled immediately ahead on a pre-sold, contract basis. 
Unless smaller volume producers and feeders lose some of their independ-
ence and begin working more actively and effectively toward cooperative types 
of feeding and marketing organizations, they may not survive. For success, 
the word "cooperation" itself must be revitalized and changed to include fully 
adequate financing, modern and imaginative corporate business principles, and 
full acceptance of specialized knowledge in the areas of breeding, nutrition, 
animal health, economics, hedging and marketing. This, of course, would re-
quire some basic changes in industry attitudes. 
The point of this discussion is that there is a great need within agri-
culture for the expertise and financial resources available from public sources. 
The limited partnership arrangement is not new. It was employed for many years 
in the gas and oil industries as a device for garnering risk capital. Its use 
in cattle feeding, another high risk capital area, was greatly needed. 
The limited partnership device was pioneered within the cattle feeding 
sector of the economy by two or three individuals. One was an accountant with 
considerable experience with cattle feeding and tax deferral investments. 
Another was an individual with a degree in agriculture but with experience as 
a bank president in corporate finance. This man is now part of the top manage-
ment of a cattle feeding firm that has made the transition from traditional 
and conventional agricultural philosophies and practices to those of the modern 
business world. Cattle feeding losses over the past year have been largely 
offset through several profitable land development deals and, since the summer 
of 1974, through hedging. The firm was in position to lend depleted limited 
partnership funds sufficient capital to continue. 
Generating Public Funds 
The ingenuity of cattle feeders in acquiring adequate supplies of capital 
must be admired. The problem, however, was serious. About 1967-68, it became 
clear that something needed to be done quickly. 
In Texas as in most states, we have an individual independent banking 
system with fairly stringent laws against branch banking. By the late 1960's 
the country banks had reached their loan limits and even those in central 
cities such as Amarillo and Lubbock, where only one or two were at all interested 
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in agricultural loans, were straining correspondent relationships. Most banks 
at that time were not far from the point where they had been having the bank's 
brand placed on all cattle under chattel mortgages. Few were willing to lend 
on cattle outside the immediate area where they could be inspected periodically 
by bank personnel. The problem was particularly difficult for cattle feeding 
firms with feedlots in several different states. A Texas lawyer or cattle 
feeding club with plans for feeding in New Mexico or California, for example, 
found it extremely difficult to obtain financing. 
Lawrence Warehouse Systems, pioneered by cattle feeders, helped greatly 
toward solution of the interstate problem. with the cattle under bond and a 
warehouse receipt, a Texas feedlot was in position to request financing for 
the feedlot or customers in any of the major financial centers including San 
Francisco, Chicago or New York. 
A few firms established subsidiary finance corporations of their own. 
These were most advantageous to interstate firms. For example, one in 
California, which works through one of the larger Los Angeles banks, finances 
many of the cattle fed by the firm for customers in Texas and New Mexico, with 
no apparent problems. 
In the search for outside funds, a few of our cattle feeding firms became 
public rather than closely held corporations. In general, efforts by these 
firms to acquire capital through public sale of stock were not particularly 
successful. In some cases, however, it was through stock trades that ranches 
or other additional facilities or enterprises were acquired. 
A few also developed special high investment partnership programs de-
signed to attract wealthy individuals or firms. For one firm, with a minimum 
limit investment requirement of $150,000, these private program offerings were 
highly successful until, of course, much of the capital that had been obtained 
in this manner was lost during 1973-74. In this case, guarantees on a high 
percentage of the original investment made the losses especially serious. Such 
private partnership offerings have been brought under the surveillance of SEC. 
A formal prospectus and SEC approval are now required. 
The limited partnership was by far the most successful device. Much 
pioneering development was necessary. Most security dealers and state security 
commissions, as well as the general public, were unfamiliar with limited 
partnerships, especially as they applied to cattle feeding. 
In developing a limited partnership, a separate wholly owned corporation 
usually, but not always, is formed to serve as the general partner. For example, 
Wheatheart Cattle Feeders formed Wheatheart Cattle Company for this purpose 
with its own interlocking board of directors. The president of the cattle com-
pany, the general partner, while an officer in the parent company, spends 
virtually all of his time on fund business. 
Early in the year, prospectuses are prepared on any new issues. Written 
according to SEC specifications, these are detailed and emphasize all types of 
risks and possible conflicts of interest. Organizational 
characteristics of the firm, all fees, and audited financial details of the 
firm are laid bare. Following approval by SEC there is little excuse for any 
prospective investor not to understand the risks he would assume by investing. 
The partnerships are sold through members of the National Association of 
Securities Dealers (NASD) but the general partner normally reserves the right 
to sell directly at the eight percent commission received by the dealers. Be-
fore some of the larger securities dealers will recommend the offering to their 
various branch offices acros~ the country, they often require special analyses 
referred to earlier as "due diligence studies." In these studies, technical 
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and business management capabilities of the entire firm and subsidiaries are 
emphasized. 
Selling usually is done from September through December. Some have a 
December 1 cut-off date so that prepaid feed can be purchased prior to 
January 1. 
How Public Funds Are Used 
My ~tudies have indicated that, in general, the private and public 
partnersh1p programs have been managed exceptionally well. Generally, how-
ever, management ~as negligen~ in ~ne particular area. I refer to hedging. 
I was amazed to f1nd that untll th1s past summer none of the companies with 
which I have become familiar did any significant amount of hedging for them-
selves~ the funds, or others. Instead, the dollar averaging theory, supported 
by a w1dely quoted study out of Rice University, was adopted and embraced 
tenaciously. One major firm still clings to it and still has undertaken very 
littl? hedging. Most others, however, have made 180 degree directional changes 
on th1s matter. In fact, some now have adopted sophisticated techniques for 
forecasting breakeven costs and have adopted a philosophy of buying cattle only 
when they can be hedged profitably. 
The basic purpose of the funds, so far as the general partner and the 
parent company are concerned, is to keep feeding facilities operating as near 
capacity as possible. Custom feedyards operate much like hotels as they sell 
services, space, feed, and management at predetermined fees. If the feedlot 
is operating near capacity, the feeding company will make a comfortable return 
on investment regardless of cattle prices. This, of course, is a potential 
source of conflict of interest. In the short run the parent company might be 
guilty of buying feeder cattle and operating under conditions in which there 
is little possibility of profits. It also might load the funds with so many 
charges that under normal conditions profits are virtually precluded. 
There probably have been some abuses. In general, however, managers 
take a very serious view toward their public funds. They know that unless 
their funds return acceptable profits, the firm will acquire a poor reputation 
among securities dealers and that public funds will no longer be available. 
In this respect, the firms offering limited partnerships are highly competitive. 
The funds are leveraged about two to one. In earlier years, it was two 
and one-half or three to one but all have become more conservative. Some of 
the funds were so large that even lead banks as prominent as the First National 
of Chicago found it desirable to enlist other banks as participants. 
To the extent found practicable, feed grain is prepaid and this practice 
will continue so long as there are tax advantages or compelling economic 
reasons for doing so. Other storable feeds such as hay or silage also are 
often purchased on a prepaid basis. In earlier years when the funds were 
being initiated, high percentages of the cattle needed for the year also were 
purchased in the fall, either for immediate placement or for growing or back-
grounding. More recently, more of the cattle have been purchased on a 
scheduled basis through the year. 
Management practices in connection with fund cattle gradually have been 
improved. Most of the firms now employ not only accountants and specialists 
in finance but one man who is exclusively concerned with the cattle. He buys 
or executes orders for purchases and inspects the cattle on arrival at the feed-
yard under arrangements in which the cattle, if rejected for any reason, belong 
to the order buyer or the original seller. This individual a~ong with ot~ers 
is made responsible for monitoring progress of the cattle dur1ng the feedlng 
period. This is accomplished through visual inspection but even more thorough-
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ly through use of highly detailed daily computer printouts. These daily "yard 
sheets" go through the hierarchy of the management team, anyone of whom may 
ask for further information. In some instances, the established role is 
management by exception. The fund specialist also may be made exclusively re-
sponsible for decisions concerning the sale of fund cattle. In selling, how-
ever, he generally will consult closely with other persons inside and outside 
the firm. 
Concluding Comments 
Prominent custom cattle feeders, especially those employing public funds, 
are fully aware of all of the arguments and controversies concerning tax 
shelters and their possible effects. Industry leaders have been working with 
the technical staff of the Ways and Means Committee and the Treasury Department 
toward solutions. Incidentally, they find Ways and Means the more receptive. 
The industry itself has been doing some soul-searching and long range 
planning. What is desired is fair and equitable tax legislation that will en-
able the industry to operate on a sound business basis with public funds and 
in a tax climate that is not constantly subject to change. It is believed 
that the industry needs to retain some tax incentives commensurate with the 
risk involved. 
The Treasury proposal referred to as LAL (limitation on artificial 
accounting losses) is not considered fair or equitable. LAL would prevent the 
deduction of farm losses against nonfarm income only when crops or livestock 
are to be sold in a later year. The complete prohibition of an inter-year 
basis seems unduly harsh. Since farm losses would be deductible against non-
farm income within the year, marketings could become exceptionally large in 
November and December. Numerous possible instances could be cited of ineq-
uities among farmers that would result from enactment of the LAL proposal. 
possible upward effects of prepaid purchases on grain prices are rec-
ognized but, to my knowledge, the extent .of these effects has not been 
determined statistically. Alleged effects of concentrated purchases of feeder 
cattle on feeder prices and on fat-feeder price ratios also are acknowledged. 
It also is understood, however, that these effects are not "all bad." The 
practices have tended to increase demand for grain and feeder cattle at a time 
of year when market supplies of these commodities normally are seasonally large 
and prices seasonally low. In addition, feeder cattle purchases, as mentioned 
earlier, became more evenly distributed through the year as public programs 
matured. In any case, responsible cattle industry leaders and their organiza-
tions are devoting considerable thought to possible remedies. 
The charge that the growth of tax shelters tends toward waste of capital 
resources appears largely unfounded so far as cattle feeding and most of agri-
culture are concerned. There undoubtedly have been abuses and instances of 
investments of an uneconomic nature. However, nearly everyone within agricul-
ture, and especially firms employing public funds, want to eliminate possibil-
ities for such abuses. The firms most directly involved, with few exceptions, 
are managed by intelligent, reputable and responsible people. To these people, 
the long run benefits ofacaess to public risk capital are too great to 
jeopardize through abuses for short term gains. Use of public funds has per-
mitted the cattle feeding industry to adopt new lower cost technology and 
management practices and to improve efficiency. 
If tax loss incentives are effectively prevented, many cattle feeding 
companies will nevertheless attempt to sell limited partnerships, strictly on 
economic grounds. I suspect that if this becomes necessary, they will be suc-
cessful. Some firms already are making plans with this possibility in view. 
Trends toward fewer, larger commercialized farming or feeding operations might 
be slowed but they probably cannot be halted. 
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UTILIZATION OF SPECIAL FARM TAX RULES 
W. Fred Woods and Thomas A. Carlin* 
Economic Research Service 
United States Department of Agriculture 
Who are the users of the special farm tax rules? IIFarmers" is the auto-
matic response. We usually think of farmers as people whose occupation is 
farming, but the IRS (Internal Revenue Service) definition of a farmer is any-
one who operates or manages a farm for gain or profit. The term IIfarm ll em-
braces the farm "in the ordinarily accepted sense ll and includes stock, dairy, 
poultry, and truck farmers as well as plantations, ranches, and all land used 
for farming operations. An individual need not reside on his farm to be ! 
farmer. He may operate his farming business himself or through a tenant, 
manager, or agent~ furthermore, he is engaged in the business of farming if 
he is a member of a farm partnership. To sum up, the term IIfarmer ll is not a 
very restrictive answer to our opening question. Let us then talk about the 
utilization of special tax rules by people with farm earnings. 
In this paper we will attempt to summarize the extent to which people 
with farm earnings utilize special income tax rules, both those related to the 
farm business and those available to all taxpayers. In addition, we will touch 
upon one or two tax related topics of potential interest to the agricultural 
community. 
What and How Much? 
The considerable interest in users of farm tax rules sterns, in large de-
gree, from the fact that this special tax treatment accorded to income from 
farming, when comb~ned with large amounts of nonfarm income, can produce the 
ideal tax shelter. Obviously, not all who use the farm tax rules are seeking 
tax shelters. But the available evidence, circumstantial and otherwise, indi-
cates the apparent presence of agricultural investments heavily motivated by 
income tax considerations. 
The Federal income tax structure provides a sUbstantial preference to 
investments by high income taxpayers. First, the progressive income tax rate, 
when combined with provisions to induce additional business spending (e.g., 
accelerated depreciation), makes the benefits from many deductions increase 
as one's income tax bracket rises. Secondly, the preferential capital gains 
rate encourages high bracket taxpayers to convert ordinary income into income 
from capital gains, thus reducing total tax liability. The special farm in-
come tjX rules further contribute to the attractiveness of these basic fea-
tures. This situation goes against basic notions of equity, whereby benefits 
*-
Views expressed are the authors' and do not necessarily represent those of 
the U. S. Department of Agriculture. 
IHowever, a taxpayer who receives a fixed rent--without reference to produc-
-·-tion--is engaged in the business of farming only if he materially participates 
in the operation or management of the farm. (See Ch~rles DaVenp?rt, Farm 
Accounting Rules and Crop Share Rents: Farm Corporat~ons and The1r Income 
Tax Treatment, ERS unnumbered, U.S. Dept. Agr., April 1974, pp. 1-33). 
2See Hugh Calkins, IITax Sheltering in Perspective," Taxes - the Tax Magazine, 
51:12, Dec. 1973, pp. 758-59. 
3For example, costs of raising breeding livestock can be treated as an operat-
ing expense for Federal income tax purposes. Yet the proceeds from the sale 
of such livestock can be treated as capital gains income. High income tax-
payers could benefit greatly by using these special tax rules. 
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of specific tax provisions should be income-neutral, all things considered. 
A Joint Economic Committee study of Federal subsidy p~ograms estimated 
total fiscal 1970 subsidies to agriculture at $5.7 billion. Of 18 separate 
programs identified, the second largest, costing an estimated $880 million, was 
agricultural tax subsidies (Table 1). In 1974, due to an increase in the cost 
of tax benefits associated with rising farm incomes and a decrease in direct 
benefit commodity stabilization programs, the agricultural tax subsidy was the 
largest Federal farm usubsidyrr program, amounting to $1.2 billion out of a 
total of $4.8 billion, or 25 percent of the total Federal subsidy program for 
agriculture. The JEC staff further projected that tax benefits would make up 
44.7 percent of all Federal agriculture subsidies for fiscal year 1975. 5 
Characterization as Federal Subsidy 
Lest there be any objection to our characterization of farm tax rules as 
a subsidy, let us point out that this view has considerable support. 6 The 
Joint Economic Committee of the U. S. Congress defines a subsidy as 
..... the provision of Federal economic assistance, at the expense 
of others in the economy, to the private sector producers or 
consumers of a particular good, service or factor of production. 
The Government alters the price or cost of the good, service or 
factor as a quid pro quo for certain economic behavior by the 
recipient or the forbearance of it. The assistance may take the 
form of .•.... implicit payments through the reduction of a 
specific tax liability. IT 7 
Direct agricultural subsidy programs have long existed both for key U.S. 
farm crops and for more general purposes. Examples are those for land improve-
ment and land purchase. As such, these programs are subject to budget con-
straints and periodic legislative review. On the other hand, the special tax 
rules provide an indirect or implicit subsidy over which the Government has 
essentially no control and little precise information as to who gets it, how 
much, or, indeed, even if it is necessary. 
At least two schools of thought exist concerning the existence of pref-
erential tax treatment for agriculture. One faction contends that the special 
farm tax rules were a deliberate injection into the Federal tax structure. 
Agriculture, it is argued, is a critical industry for a strong, dynamic na-
tional economy. Thus, continued investment in our agricultural plant should 
be encouraged through the tax system. Those holding this view would support 
continued, and even extended, preferential tax treatment for farming. 
The other view holds that farmers have been permitted to use cash account-
ing and ignore year end inventories (a key to the preferential treatment issue) 
as " ... an historical concession •.•. to provide a unitary and expedient book-
keeping system .•• 118 Farmers were supposedly unable to cope with anything more 
than the most elementary accounting methods, and, due to their relative isola-
tion, did not have access to professional accounting assistance. Admittedly, 
such practices result in a distortion of income and clearly violate basic 
accounting principles. Adherents of this argument maintain that today's farmers 
4Joint Economic Committee, Federal Subsidy Programs, U. S. Govt. Printing 
Office, Oct. 18, 1974. 
5 Same source as footnote 4, page 18. 
6Same source as footnote 4. 
7Same source as footnote 4, page 1. 
8 U.S. vs. Catto, 384 U.S. 102, 116 (1960). 
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Table l--Gross Budgetary Costs of Federal Agricultural II Subsidy" Programs 
(In millions of dollars) 
Direct Cash Payments: 
Commodity Purchase 
Cotton Production Stabilization 
Feed Grain Production Stabilization 
Sugar Production Stabilization 
Wheat Production Stabilization 
National Wool Act 
Dairy and Beekeeper Indemnity 
Agricultural Conservation Program (REAP) 
Cropland Adjustment 
Tax Subsidies: Expensing and Capital Gains 
From Farming 
Credit Subsidies: 
Commodity Price Support 
Storage Facility and Equipment 
Rural Electrification 
Rural Telephone 
Miscellaneous Farm Credit Programs 
Community Facilities 
Benefit-in-Kind: 
Emergency Livestock Feed Program 
Fertilizer Development 
Totall 
------------ Fiscal year ------------
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
688 
828 
1,644 
93 
863 
53 
o 
185 
77 
880 
40 
2 
239 
o 
95 
o 
o 
7 
5,694 
735 
917 
1,504 
84 
874 
72 
o 
150 
78 
820 
17 
o 
195 
o 
49 
o 
845 
824 
1,052 
88 
878 
113 
5 
196 
67 
840 
26 
-1 
230 
37 
53 
o 
o 1 
7 7 
5,502 5,261 
625 
813 
1,846 
89 
863 
68 
6 
29 
52 
280 
715 
1,171 
89 
477 
o 
3 
90 
50 
900 1,200 
9 10 
6 3 
257 220 
72 76 
244 218 
77 192 
18 9 
8 8 
5,982 4,.811 
lIndividual items may not add to totals due to rounding error. 
Source: u.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee, Federal Subsidy 
Programs. Washington, D.C., 1974. 
no longer need this special treatment and that artificial and invalid distinc-
tions between agriculture and other businesses should be eliminated. 
A more moderate view might hold that, in the interests of equity and 
good judgment, the nature and extent of the indirect tax subsidy be clearly 
identified, evaluated, and made subject to the same budgetary restraints as are 
direct Federal agricultural subsidies. 
utilization of the Farm Tax Rules 
At least three separate groups make extensive use of special tax pro-
visions for u. S. agriculture: (1) continuing or "ordinary" farmers who depend 
upon agricultural earnings for their major source of livelihood, (2) tax shelter 
investors who are generally believed to be motivated primarily by tax considera-
tions, and (3) investors for whom the tax shelter feature is an attractive con-
sideration but not the primary incentive. 9 
9"A realistic look at the advantages to be achieved by tax sheltering confirms 
the good sense of the proposition •.• that the tax benefits are the icing on the 
cake. An investment which has no intrinsic merit, apart from the tax benefit, 
should probably be avoided. II (D. Lee Bawden, Administrative Guidelines for 
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Most public attention has been focused on groups (2) and (3). And 
supporting evidence for many discussions has been based on the analysis of the 
high income portion of the personal income distribution. For instance, 83 per-
cent of the 8,750 taxpayers with farming operations and gross incomes over 
$100,000 in 1970 deducted slightly more than $239 million in farm losses from 
their other income. lO It is difficult to believe that these losses in partic-
ular were not heavily affected by use of the special tax rules. However, con-
centrating on only one segment of people with farm earnings gives an incomplete 
picture of the use of special tax provisions. 
For all individual taxpayers, nearly 1.3 million reported farm losses 
in 1970 totaling $2.9 million compared with less than 1.7 million reporting 
farm profits of $5.6 million (Table 2). Oddly enough, sole proprietorships 
reporting farm losses paid more total taxes than did those with farm profits--
they contributed 53 percent of the Federal income taxes collected from the 
group even though they accounted for just 43 percent of the returns reporting 
farming operations. 
Table 2--Farm Earnings, Taxable Income, and Tax Liability 
of People with Farm Earnings, 1970 
All 
Item Unit Farm profit Farm loss returns 
Return.s •••••...•• : 1,000 1,651 1,255 2,906 
Farm earnings .••. : mil. dol. 5,599 -2,922 2,677 
T axab Ie in come •.. : mil. dol. 7,845 7,469 15,314 
Tax liability •••. : mil. dol. 1,653 1,871 3,524 
Source: Special tabulations by the u.S. Dept. of Treasury, 
Internal Revenue Service, from the 1970 Sole 
Proprietorship Tax Model. 
But although loss returns contribute more to total taxes than profit re-
turns, farm losses are not particularly concentrated at high income levels. 
Relatively low income taxpayers had the highest proportion of farm losses. 
And most losses were small ones. Forty percent of total farm losses were re-
ported by individuals with less than $5,000 in basic income,ll and more than 
90 percent of 1970 farm loss returns reported a loss of less than $5,000. 
Income Maintenance Programs Covering the Self-Employed, Studies in Public Wel-
fare, Paper No.5, Part 3, Joint Economic Committee, u.S. Congress, March 12, 
1973, page 760.) Yet, considerable evidence exists that investments of the 
latter type are widely promoted. (V.L. Harrison and W. Fred Woods, Farm and 
Nonfarm Investments in Beef Breeding Herds -- Consequences of the Tax Law, 
ERS-497, U.S. Dept. Agr., April 1972, page 71; and House Committee on Ways 
and Means, Panel Discussions on Tax Reform: Panel No.5, Farm Operations, 
February 20, 1973, u.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1973, pages 80-81.) 
10Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income, Business Income Tax Returns, 
1970, U.S. Dept. Treas., Sept. 1973, page 107. 
llBasic income is defined as adjusted gross income plus excluded capital gains, 
dividends, and other adjustments to lncome. It more nearly reflects the 
income available to the taxpayer for personal consumption, investment, and 
other purposes than does adjusted gross income. 
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Losses of $10,000 or more were reported by about 3 percent of the loss group, 
and these werr2 concentrated in two basic income ~lasses--those with negative basic incomes and those with $25,000 or more. l Only 0.2 percent of 1970 
sole proprietorship returns reported farm losses of $50,000 or more. These 
data do not, however, refute the existence of high income tax loss farmers who 
own or invest in large farming businesses operated at a loss for the purpose 
of reducing income tax liability, although they do suggest that such individ-
uals are not typical in American agriculture. 
But while high income tax loss farmers may not be typical, their losses 
are probably motivated more by tax than real economic considerations. Nonfarm 
income was substantially higher for individuals reporting farm losses than for 
those reporting profits. For instance, (1) farm loss returns reporting farm 
sales of $100,000 or more reported seven times as much nonfarm income as did 
those with farm profits, (2) three times as many individuals with basic incomes 
of $50,000 or more reported farm losses than reported farm profitsi and (3) 
there was a distinct tendency for larger farm loss returns to be found in 
Standard Federal Administrative Regions containing major cities. 
If special farm tax provisions are intended to benefit taxpayers pri-
marily dependent upon farming for their livelihood, these special rules appear 
to be abused by taxpayers seeking tax shelters. However, the majority of farm 
loss returns, in terms of size of loss and amount of nonfarm income reported, 
do not appear to be tax shelters. These, in the absence of additional in-
formation, may be considered by many as "legitimate" farm losses claimed by 
the intended beneficiaries. 
Capital Gains. About one-third of the 2.9 million individuals filing 
farm income tax returns in 1970 reported capital gains. Although the propor-
tion reporting capital gains within basic income classes increased as basic 
income increased, a high proportion of those reporting capital gains had low 
basic incomes. For example, 33 percent of those reporting capital gains had 
basic incomes of less than $5,000. More than 60 percent had basic incomes of 
$10,000 or less. Total capital gains, however, were generally concentrated 
in the higher income groups. 
Average capital gains reported per individual, with the exception of 
the negative basic income group, increased sharply as basic income increased 
from $1,070 per farm taxpayer with less than $3,500 in basic income to 
$152,950 for taxpayers with basic incomes of $100,000 or more. When taxpayers 
were classified according to value of farm products sold, a similar pattern 
was observed. 
As expected, livestock farms reported the largest pro~ortion of farms 
with capital gains while crop farms had the smallest proportlon. However, 
average capital gains per taxpayer were the largest for frui~, vege~able, and 
tree nut farms; livestock farms had the smallest average capltal galns, smaller 
even than average capital gains for crop farms. 
Due to the combination of farm tax rules permitting the current deduc-
l2The reader should be careful in interpreting the "negative basic income" 
class. A major weakness in the basic income concept,is that it does not 
distinguish between true economic losses and ac~ountlng losses as a res~lt 
of special tax rules. Unfortunately, we know,lltt~e about those reportlng 
negative basic incomes. We expect that many ln thlS group actually have tax 
induced losses. 
l3Thomas A. Carlin and W. Fred Woods, Tax Loss Farming, ERS-546, u.s. Dept. 
Agr., April 1974, page 20. 
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tion of certain development expenses and the preferential capital gains treat-
ment under present u.s. income tax law, it has been generally believed that 
the taxation of capital gains as ordinary income would improve the progressiv-
ity of the income tax burden in agriculture. The analysis of 1970 farm tax 
returns did not support this view. Substantial increases in tax liability 
occurred for both high and low basic income groups with smaller increases for 
those in the middle income range. 
The distribution of both taxable income and tax liability would have 
been changed little by the abolition of the preferential tax treatment for 
capital gains. However, the total tax bill of persons with farming activities 
would have increasI2 by more than $750 million, or an average tax increase of $500 per taxpayer. Although the distribution of tax burden was changed 
little, individuals with basic incomes over $25,000 would have borne three-
fourths of the increase in taxes with those with $100,000 or more income pay-
ing 54 percent of the increase. 
Taxing capital gains as ordinary income would have increased the tax 
bill of taxpayers with fruit, vegetable, and tree nut farms most and those 
with field crop farms least. Although livestock farms reported the greatest 
frequency of capital gains, their increased burden was less than for all other 
types except field crop farms. 
Use of Cash Accounting. More than 97 percent of the individuals report-
ing 1970 farm earnings used the cash method of accounting. Only 75,776 of the 
2.9 million farm tax returns were reported on the accrual method. 15 Surprising-
ly, there was little difference in the proportion of loss returns between the 
users of the two methods: 43.9 percent of the accrual returns reported farm 
losses as did 43.1 percent of the cash basis returns. Unfortunately, we have 
no data on the users of the accrual method by type of farming operation. 
Investments in Beef Breeding Herds. The initial publicity given the 
tax loss farming issue centered on investments in beef breeding herds. The 
opportunities for the combination of tax loss and economic gain were widely 
advertised prior to the 1969 tax reform act. And even though the 1969 legis-
lation redyged the tax attractions of these investments by perhaps as much as 
one-third, some pUblicity persists. 
However, an ERS simulation study completed in 1972, based on prices 
prevailing in the 1959-70 period, showed that investments in beef breeding 
herds were not profitable for nonfarmer-investors unless they were in the 50 
percent marginal tax bracket and above. Even then, the investments were 
profitable only if product prices and input costs were very favorable. 17 The 
study found no economic incentive for these type investments through manage-
ment companies without the special incentive provided by preferential capital 
l4capital gains from nonfarm investments are also included in this estimate. 
15 
We were unable to distinguish between farm and nonfarm sources. Therefore, 
we cannot compare this figure with the total agricultural tax subsidy esti-
mate cited earlier. 
Same source as footnote 10, page 106. 
l6Hoy Carman, IITax Loss Agricultural Investments after Tax Reform, ,I Aroer. 
Jour. of Agr. Econ., 54:4, Nov. 1972, p. 14. Richard G. Sullivan, An 
Analysis of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 and the Elimination of Capital Gains 
on Investments in Beef Breeding Herds, unpublished M.S. thesis, Univ. Mo., 
Columbia, 1971. 
l7v. L. Harrison and W. Fred Woods, Farm and Nonfarm Investments in Beef Breed-
ing Herds--Consequences of the Tax Law, ERS-497, U.S. Dept. Agr., April 1972. 
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gains treatment and the offsetting of nonfarm income by farm losses currently 
allowed under the nation's tax law. 
Subsequently, a USDA survey of the ownership of the U. S. beef breed-
ing herd revealed that investors apparently were in agreement with the con-
clusions of the above study. The survey found that almost 95 percent of the 
nation's January 1, 1974 herd of 53.6 million animals wat owned by the farm 
operat?r ?n whose farm or ranch the cattle were located. 8 Of the approximate-
ly 3 m~ll~on head owned by someone other than the farm operator, 1.9 million 
(63 percent) were owned by others classified as farm operators. Just over a 
million head were actually owned by nonfarm interests--2.0 percent of the total 
beef breeding herd. And one-fourth of these were owned by nonfarm individuals 
with less than 20 animals each. 
Recent Developments in Limited Partnership Investments. The structuring 
and promotion of tax-sheltered investments in agriculture has heavily utilized 
the limited partnership vehicle. Although limited partnerships are apparently 
participating in a broad range of agricultural enterprises--eggs, wine grapes, 
citrus and other grove type crops, cattle breeding and feeding, and general 
crop farming--the heaviest concentration of limited partnerships seems to have 
been in the area of cattle feeding. By mid 1973, tax shelter funds were con-
servatively estimated to have channelled possibly as much as $350-400 million 
of tax induced equity capital into the cattle feeding industry, primarily in 
the form of limited partnership investments. i9 Since this capital is usually 
highly leveraged, it may have provided financial support for as much as one-
fourth of total feed lot inventory capital requirements nationally. Although 
much of this equity investment was dissipated through 1974 developments in 
cattle feeding, the tax benefits generated substantially exceeded the original 
equity investment. Unpublished ERS estimates as of May 1, 1974 indicated that 
there were some 110 cattle feeding funds in the U. S. These funds had organized 
an estimated 540 limited partnerships and attracted some 20,000 investors who 
had invested equity capital of approximately $500 million. 
Since investors in agricultural-limited partnerships are classed as 
"farmers" under the tax rules, they report the results of their farming 
operations on individual income tax returns and are included in those farm 
loss returns earlier discussed. 
Itemized Deductions. Up to this point we have concentrated on tax pro-
visions which relate primarily to the business aspects of farming. People with 
farm earnings also benefit from many provisions not directly related to farm 
production. Actually, the subsidy effect of these provisions to all tax-
payers far exceeds that of farm tax rules to farm taxpayers. Recent estimates 
for 1970 suggest that the use of special deductions for medical expenses, 
State and local taxes, charitable contributions, and interest payments pri-
marily on home mortgages subsidizes all American ~axpayers ~y arou~d $12 bil-
lion. 20 This does not include several other spec~al deduct~ons wh~ch also 
appear on schedule A of form 1040. 
In 1970, 2.2 million people with farm earnings it?mized deduc~ions-­
over 77 percent of those filing a farm tax schedule. Th~s group cla~med 
l8W• Fred Woods, "Highlights of a Special Survey on OWnership of ~eef Breeding 
Cattle: A Staff Report," U.S. Dept. Agr., ERS, October 1974 (m~meo.). 
-'-
19CAST Task Force Evaluation of the U.S. Treasury's proposed Limitation on 
Artificial Acco~nting Losses and the Potential Impact on U.S. Agriculture, 
Council for Agricultural Science and Technology, Nov. 5, 1973, page 10. 
20J ' , 'tt F d 1 Subsl.'dy Programs U S Govt Printing o~nt Economl.C Coroml. ee, e era , •• . • 
Office, October 18, 1974. 
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itemized deductions amounting to $4.1 billion. Had those itemizing deductions 
used the standard deduction for 1970, their tax liability would have increased 
by $242 million or $108 per return. Had all deductions been disallowed includ-
ing the standard deduction, tax liability for this group would have increased 
$1,221 million or $544 per return. This figure exceeds the tax subsidies from 
expensing and capital gains provisions for farmers. 
A high proportion of people with farm earnings itemize deductions at 
all income levels (Table 3). The incidence of the tax, medical, and interest 
deduction generally increased as the level of basic income increased. Be-
cause these items appeared less frequently on low income returns, special 
circumstances must have enabled these lower income units to benefit from 
itemizing in 1970. For example, casualty losses, thefts, and special business 
deductions may well have exceeded the standard deduction for many taxpayers 
at these income levels. This result suggests that a relatively high propor-
tion of low income taxpayers may have temporarily low incomes. 
Table 3--Proportion of All Returns Utilizing Selected Special 
Deductions by Size of Basic Income, 1970 
Basic Percent reporting 
income Percent Tax Medical Interest 
classes itemizing deduction deduction deduction 
Less than $2,000 63 4 3 1 
2,000 to 3,499 74 14 13 4 
3,500 to 4,999 78 33 31 10 
5,000 to 6,499 79 40 37 15 
6,500 to 7,999 82 49 45 19 
8,000 to 9,999 81 49 42 27 
10,000 to 12,499 82 56 46 32 
12,500 to 14,999 82 61 49 35 
15,000 to 24,999 84 70 56 39 
25,000 to 49,999 88 82 62 43 
50,000 to 100,000 95 93 63 59 
100,000 or more 97 97 62 68 
Total 77 50 43 19 
A Good Year for Farmers and IRS. Average income per farm operator family 
increased by over $6,000 between 1972 a~~ 1973 due largely to high export de-
mand for farm products and bad weather. Average farm operator family income 
will likely be almost as high "in 1974 as the record $19,600 reported in 1973. 
These record income levels could also produce record high income tax bills for 
many farmers. 
Actual data on the recent tax liability of pepple with farm earnings 
will not be available for 2 or 3 years. However, we have estimated that in-
dividuals and families filing a schedule F paid over $8 billion in Federal in-
come taxes in 1973, up 137 percent from 1970, the latest year for which we have 
actual data (Table 4). Our estimate of the tax bill for 1974 is almost as 
high as that of 1973. 
Several caveats should be noted about our estimate. The increase in 
tax liability is not totally due to increased farm income. As is well known, 
farm fam~1ies received a large percentage of their income from nonfarm 
sources. We estimate that about 80 percent of the increase in tax liability 
2lU. S. Dept. Agr., Farm Income Situation, FIS-224, July 1974. 
22Edward I. Reinsel, People with Farm Earnings: Sources and Distribution of 
Income, ERS-498, U. S. Dept. Agr., March 1972. 
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Table 4--Estimated Tax Liability of People with Farm Earnings, 
1971-1974Y 
Year 
1970 (actual) 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
Total tax liability 
Million dollars 
3,524 
3,699 
5,309 
8,364 
8,277 
1/Estimates are based on special tabulations from 
the 1970 sole proprietorship tax model provided 
by the Internal Revenue Service. Th~ estimating 
procedure developed by the authors assumes that . 
taxpayers behave in subsequent years as they did 
in 1970. An index of average farm operator 
family income was used to project the personal 
distribution of income. Tax liability was cal-
culated by income class and aggregated to 
national totals. 
between 1972 and 1973 was due to increases in farm income, with the rest due 
to increases in off-farm income. Secondly, we suspect our estimate is on the 
high side. The recent backlog in farm machinery orders suggests that many 
farmers have reinvested some of their income. To the extent that this was 
extraordinary, tax liability would be reduced. Also, the use of income 
averaging most likely increased, further reducing the expected tax bill. 
Thus, not all the recent increase in farm incomes went into farmers' 
pockets. About 30 percent of the estimated $10 billion increase in taxable 
income between 1972 and 1973 was probably consumed by increased Federal income 
tax liability. The years 1973 and 1974 will certainly point out to our con-
stituency that increased incomes mean higher tax bills. Thus, "Uncle Sam 
makes out too. II 
Related Tax Topics 
Before closing the discussion on special farm tax rules, let's touch on 
two related topics of interest to the agricultural community. 
Effect of the Proposed 5-Percent Surtax. Most persons are aware of the 
economic package proposed by President Ford on October 8, 1974. Perhaps the 
one item which drew the most interest from the general public was the 5-percent 
surtax on adjusted gross incomes above $15,000. As the Treasury explained this 
proposal the next day, the first $15,000 of adjusted ~~oss income for taxpayers 
filing joint returns would be exempt from the surtax. And only that component 
of tax liability which was due to incremental income above $15,000 would be 
subject to the 5-percent additional tax. 
A discussion of the merits of such a proposal is outside the scope of this 
paper. However, we have made some preliminary estimates of the impact on people 
23House Committee on Ways and Means, Hearings on the President's 5-Percent Sur-
charge Tax Proposal and Other Tax Proposals, October 9 and 10, 1974, U. S. 
Govt. Printing Office, 1974. 
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with farm earnings if it applied to tax year 1974. 24 Our estimate of the in-
crease in 1974 tax liability for people with farm earnings is about $264 mil-
lion. This represents 3.1 percent of total 1974 estimated tax liability. 
About 38 percent of people with farm earnings would be affected by the 
surtax proposal. The impact of the surtax would be very slight until income 
reached a relatively high level. Our estimates suggest that the full impact 
would not be effective until basic income reached $100,000 or more. 
Table 5--Estimated Effect of President Ford's Surtax Proposal 
on People with Farm Earnings, 1974 
Basic 
Income Class 
Dollars 
15,000 to 24,999 
25,000 to 49,999 
50,000 to 99,999 
100,000 or more 
Total 1974 
Tax Liability 
(Mil. 
1,533 
2,036 
1,373 
2,362 
Surtax 
nol. ) 
18 
70 
61 
115 
Percent 
Increase 
1.1 
3.4 
4.5 
4.9 
Welfare Reform. Welfare reform may well be a IIfront burner ll issue in 
1975. Both the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and Representative 
Martha Griffiths (D-Mich.) of the Joint Economic Committee are putting finish-
.ing touches on proposals to replace much of our current welfare system with 
a modified negative income tax. 25 Both proposals apparently will guarantee a 
minimum income to all individuals including, for the first time, the self-
employed. Those of us servicing the farming community will most likely be 
called upon to provide information concerning the potential impact of such 
proposals. For farming is still the most prominent sole proprietorship busi-
ness in the U. S. 
We have little insight at this time of precisely what the actual pro-
posals will contain. 26 However, several general aspects will be of concern. 
For example, how will self-employment be defined? How will self-employment 
income be determined? How will business assets be treated in the 'system if 
asset limitations are imposed? These q~estions have been explored in the JEC 
Subcommittee Studies in Public Welfare. 7 Additional insight will be gained 
when the results of the IIrural negative income tax experiment ll are available. 
To distinguish income from salaries and wages from self-employment in-
come, Bawden has suggested that a self-employment activity be de1~ned as one 
in which owned or rented business assets complement labor input. Thus, in-
come is based solely on output rather than viewed as a direct factor payment. 
For those renting business assets, the question of involvement in operating 
24 . We are aware that the surtax was proposed for tax year 1975, but we are some-
what reluctant to IIgaze into our crystal ball II and suggest what incomes 
might be for 1975. 
25Government Research Corporation, "HEW's Welfare Reform Plan, II National 
Journal Report, 6:42, October 19, 1974, pp. 1559-66. 
26Representative Griffiths plans to introduce a welfare proposal to Congress 
about the time this speech is -delivered. 
27n • Lee Bawden, Administrative Guidelines for Income Maintenance Programs 
Covering the Self-Employed, Studies in Public Welfare, Paper No.5, Part 3, 
Joint Economic Committee, U. S. Congress, March 12, 1973. 
28Same source as footnote 27. 26 
decisions becomes a critical variable. This definition may well serve most 
situations. However, sticky interpretations may arise for closely held family 
corporations and some partnerships. 
We do not know how income might be measured. IRS rules may well provide 
the most workable framework from both an administrative perspective and for 
minimizing t~e book~eeping burden on potential participants. However, the 
cash account~ng opt~on used by most farmers would give a high degree of 
flexibilit¥ in managing income so as to maximize the degree of participation. 
Thus, we m~ght expect some fairly strong limitations relating to income 
carry-over. The carry-over system takes into consideration past income in 
determining current program benefits. To help get around this problem, 
Bawden had suggested requiring an accrual accounting system. Although accrual 
accounting would make program administration somewhat easier, it would put 
more burden on potential recipients. Whatever the outcome, the prospect of 
integrating both positive and negative income tax activities could create a new 
agricultural clientele with a different set of problems and objectives. In 
addition, a new dimension to the use of farm tax rules would be created. 
Finally, serious thinking has been given to the idea of discounting pro-
posed negative income tax payments for business equity above some minimum 
level. The self-employed do have the option of substituting current income 
for incremental increases in net worth. The objective would be to limit the 
extent of this substitution in order to participate in a negative income tax 
plan. 
Concluding Comments 
We hope the above material will be helpful in placing the utilization of 
farm tax rules in proper perspective. We hope, also, that we have shed new 
light on some myths concerning special farm tax rules. For example, we reject 
the notion that tax loss farming is a vast playground for the "super rich ll to 
shelter large amounts of nonfarm income from IRS. Only a small proportion of 
those reporting farm losses could be so categorized. Whether this is good or 
bad is a moral judgment for each person to make. 
All people with farm earnings report capital gains income. This may not 
be surprising when we reflect that farming is a capital intensive business. 
We do note, however, that the "richll have more of it than do the IIpoor. 1I If 
capital gains were taxed as ordinary income, the effect on the income distri-
bution of people with farm earnings may not be as great as we suspected. 
Do investments in beef breeding herds offer a panacea for the wealthy 
nonfarm investor? Maybe so, but nonfarm investors far from dominate owner-
ship patterns. And is the biggest "gravy train" the limited partnerships 
in cattle feeding? One more year of high feed grai~ prices may make many 
think otherwise. 
Many farmers have as much to gain or lose from general tax provisions as 
they do from special farm tax rules. Thus, they should have as much interest 
in the outcome of debates over the medical, interest, or tax deductions as they 
do over the special treatment of livestock or any other farm tax provision. 
Thus, treating farmers as special cases should not be unduly emphasized in de-
bating the issue of basic tax reform. 
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CONSEQUENCES OF INCOME TAX LAW AND REGULATIONS: 
CATTLE FEEDING 
v. James Rhodes* 
Professor of Agricultural Economics 
University of Missouri-Columbia 
In 1974 we had the opportunity to witness the most dramatic consequences 
of the impact of income-tax-motivated investment ever to occur in the agricul-
ture of the Midwest-High Plains area. While many cattle industry people are 
aware that there is some connection between their present problems and tax 
laws, they have difficulty in penetrating the triple veils of income tax regu-
lations, investor behavior, and economic analysis in order to see what has 
happened. Even those of us who have studied these developments carefully 
would admit that it is impossible to make a precise assessment of how much the 
tax-loss investor contributed to the year's cattle ~ust. 
Certainly, high feed grain prices, the timing of price controls and the 
phase of the cattle cycle must share much of the blame. Nevertheless, there 
are lessons about taxes to be learned, lest we repeat the whole process 
in a few years. 
We start first with the fact, developed by other speakers, that we have 
on the books an income tax structure with such progressive rates that a high 
income person is expected to pay 50 to 70 percent of his top receipts in taxes. 
It's hardly surprising that such people have canvassed the entire economy for 
investment opportunities that would enable tax avoidance. In addition, they 
have prevai1edl upon the government for a great variety of 'lega1 ways to avoid that tax bite. I hope these last few remarks make it clear that I do not take 
a moral position against tax avoidance. My concerns are for economic conse-
quences. 
While the policy discussions come later in this seminar, it's obvious to 
me, as an economist, that we can't effectively close tax loopholes until we 
reduce the tremendous incentive for those loopholes represented by the extreme 
progression of the rate structure. Let's quit kidding ou elves that the 
federal income tax can take away more than 50 percent of a people's income. 
Second, let's be sure that we are clear about the motivations of the so-
called tax-loss-investor. Recently a national farm magazine had a story about 
a successful young farmer who was in partnership with two wealthy investors. 
Quite a point was made that these investors wanted to make money from the farm-
ing operations and that, therefore, they were not tax-loss-investors. The con-
fusion in the story is the assumption that tax losses and making money are 
mutually exclusive. They are not, as has been shown by earlier speakers. 
When you are in the 50 percent bracket, your thinking has to concentrate on 
after-tax returns. The tax-loss investor in cattle feeding expects to make 
money by arranging a tax loss (not a real loss) in the current accounting 
period in order to reduce his present income taxes. Then he expects to handle 
his finances in the next accounting period in such manner as to avoid paying 
those taxes which he postponed in this period. He hopes to make profits before 
taxes over the total transaction, but it's quite possible for the transaction 
to improve his after-tax income even though there were no pre-tax profits. An 
important consequence of such motivation is that the tax-loss investor, in 
order to maximize his after-tax income, is willing to accept a lower economic 
*The author gratefully acknowledges the contributions of two former students, 
Dr. Stephen Matthews and Dr. Joseph Meisner. 
lsee Joseph A. Pechman and Benjamin A. Okner, Who Bears the Tax Burden? 
Washington, D. C., Brookings, 1974. 
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return (pre-tax income) on his investment than lower income investors in the 
same industry will accept. Tax-exempt bonds are a good example. Market re-
turns are lower on tax-exempt bonds than other bonds because high income in-
vestors bid down their returns to a level nearly comparable with the after-tax 
returns to them on the other bonds. The consequence for other investors is 
this rule: if you don't need a tax shelter, you have no business buying tax 
exempts. Another important consequence of such motivation is that the tax-
loss investor is usually willing to undertake riskier investments when half 
or more of the money invested would go to Uncle Sam otherwise. 
Now let's develop the background for how all of this relates to cattle 
feeding. Cattle feeding has changed so rapidly that many persons in agricul-
ture aren't familiar with all that has happened. Cattle feeding has grown 
tremendously in the past 15 years as a result of plentiful feed supplies and a 
growing demand for beef. Most of that growth has been in the new commercial 
lots of the High Plains rather than in the farmer feedlots of the Corn Belt. 
About 55 percent of the fed cattle marketings last year were from lots 
of 4,000 head or more capacity and about 37 percent were from lots of 16,000 
head or more. 
Most of the cattle in these large lots are owned by customers rather than 
by the feedlot firms, although there are a few well-known exceptions such as 
the giant Monfort yards. Thus, most large commercial lots are in the animal 
hotel business. Like other innkeepers, their earnings depend upon their suc-
cess in finding enough lodgers--cattle in this case--to keep the place full. 
At first, farmers, ranchers, and local businessmen were the principal cus-
tomers. As the lots grew in volume, they outgrew local sources of customer 
capital. Large investors from the metropolitan centers were then sought. A-
bout 1969, tax-loss investors and large custom lots discovered the mutual ad-
vantages of the limited partnership and other special arrangements. The 
investor discovered a way to postpone and perhaps avoid income taxes. The 
feedlot discovered a huge supply of customer capital that would accept very low 
before-tax returns. 
The marriage prospered beautifully fora while. A survey of large lots, 
taken by a special Tax Committee formed by the feedlots, found that the number 
of outside investor cattle doubled from December 1970 to December 1971 and 
doubled again the next year. At its peak in 1973, investor cattle were prob-
ably close to one-fifth of all the nation's cattle on feed. They were mostly 
in the bigger lots. Investor cattle constituted one-half or more of the cattle 
in many of the large, fast-growing lots. 
Something in excess of 300 million dollars poured into feedlots within a 
three year period. While some limited partnerships accepted individual invest-
ments as small as $3,000, the bulk of the money came in much larger chunks. 
One study in Texas reported that the average number fed per customer in 1972 
was 3,000 cattle, which would have required an equity investment of 150 to 200 
thousand dollars. 
Since a tax deferral via cattle feeding can usually be arranged very 
quickly, it has been particularly attractive to people who realize rather late 
in the calendar year that they have an income tax problem. A consequence of 
these late investments has been almost frenzied bidding for feeder cattle and 
feed in November and December as lots strove to get that tax-loss money invest-
ed. One manager, lacking such outside funds, commented that there was no use 
going to the Amarillo feeder cattle auction when the managers of funds were 
bidding. 
With that background as to recent developments in tax-loss cattle feeding, 
let's try to appraise the tax consequences. A recent study by the Joint Economic 
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committee of Congress suggested that three tests ought to be applied in apprais-
ing the consequences of a tax subsidy: 
(1) Does it correct a market deficiency? 
(2) How do costs (in lost taxes) compare with benefits? 
(3) How are benefits spread among income groups? 
From the public interest point of view, has there been a shortage of 
capital in cattle feeding that justified public subsidy? Although a few 
persons will disagree, my answer is unequivocally, no. Some may ask, doesn't 
the very fact of the entry of tax-loss-capital show that it was needed? Not 
when such capital has an advantage over existing capital. The industry actual-
ly had too much capital, which funded the unrealistically high feeder cattle 
prices in the fall of 1972 and 1973. Feedlot managers indicate that many of 
their farm and ranch customers dropped out when the funds helped to drive up 
feeder cattle prices to dizzy heights. Likewise, many Corn Belt feeders left 
their lots empty rather than compete in such markets. 
Approached from another angle, the capital--both equity and debt--involv-
ed in cattle feeding is seen as tiny compared to the total capital invested 
in American agriculture. It's easy to see why fast-growing feedlots concen-
trated in a dozen counties in Texas might find capital scarce, even while 
usual capital sources were more than adequate in the Corn Belt. 
The argument that the tax subsidy in cattle feeding has had a favorable 
cost-benefit ratio is no more convincing than the argument that there was a 
"market need" for the capital. 
In a competitive industry, the injection of tax-subsidized capital 
usually means an income transfer from taxpayers to consumers. If we could 
look at a cattle industry that had been in long-term equilibrium, receiving 
tax subsidies all the while, we would likely find a moderate sized cost 
(say $200 million a year) to taxpayers. While the fund promoters and feedlots 
would capture some benefits, a lion's share would likely be passed to con-
sumers. Gains and benefits might be roughly equal. There would be some re-
distribution of income from lower to higher income individuals. 
However, in a sector which cycles like the cattle industry, we cannot 
hope to experience such long term equilibrium results. Instead, the injection 
of tax-loss capital has kicked off a long chain of events which is not yet 
complete, and which is difficult to summarize adequately. 
The feeding industry lost great sums of money in 1974. Most of the high-
ly leveraged investment funds became broke or nearly so. Investors realized 
not only tax losses but also very real losses. The U. S. Treasury has shared 
these losses--probably on a dollar for dollar basis. Information is not avail-
able to measure accurately these total losses to the Treasury in taxes in the 
past 4 years, but they must be in the neighborhood o~ a few hundred million 
dollars. 
Where are the benefits to offset those losses? They are hard to find. 
Some lucky investors who got in and got out before the crash did receive 
benefits. However, those investors who lost their total investments are more 
typical. The cow-calf producers were beneficiaries in 1972-73 to the extent 
that feeder cattle prices were driven up by tax-loss bidding. However, that 
bidding in a sense has contributed to the greater crash of feeder prices in 
the fall of 1974. The final measure of benefits to the ranchers is not likely 
to be very substantial. 
There are other possible beneficiaries. The fund promoters and the 
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associated feedlots obviously benefited in the earlier years, but as many have 
since teetered on the edge of bankruptcy, they may deny receipt of any long 
term benefits. What about benefit to consumers? If the stronger feeder 
prices of 1971-73 encouraged the keeping of more breeding stock, then con-
sumers may reap some benefit in the next few years from larger supplies of 
beef. 
In our final tally, we need to include the impacts upon the relative 
fortunes of farmer-feeders of the Midwest compared to the large lots of the 
High Plains. These impacts extended, of course, to the associated agribusi-
nesses and communities for which cattle feeding is an important economic base. 
One of the great revolutions of postwar agriculture has been the move of cattle 
feeding from the Midwest to the Southern High Plains. Undoubtedly, much of 
that switch can be attributed tp the advantages of cheap feed, favorable cli-
mate, and economies of scale possessed by the growth regions. Yet in the past 
three years there have been ample reasons for Corn Belt feeders to feel that 
they were losing out to a system that had tapped the resources of the U. S. 
Treasury. It is one thing to lose a competitive struggle with a more effi-
cient competitor; it is another to lose to a tax-subsidized competitor. 
In summary, then, I find the tax-subsidy in cattle feeding to lack 
justification on all three counts. First, there were no market barriers to 
the inflow of capital into cattle feeding which would have created a need for 
tax-subsidized capital. Instead, the tax-subsidy brought in too much capital 
and added a small, but significant, contribution to the present market bust. 
Second, the benefits are so difficult to locate that it seems very likely that 
they were far less than the costs to the Treasury--and ultimately to the rest 
of us as taxpayers. Third, because of the 1974 cattle market crash, the dis-
tribution of benefits has been like leaves in a windstorm rather than a logi-
cal serving of a public purpose. 
Defenders of this tax-subsidy may argue that its association with a 
market bust puts it in the worst possible light. It is plausible that in a 
different economic climate the public assessment of the cost-benefits would 
be more favorable. However, I am not aware of a possible state of the economy 
in which a clear benefit-cost ratio can be shown for this type of public sub-
sidy of the production and consumption of beef. 
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CONSEQUENCES OF INCOME TAX LAW AND REGULATIONS: 
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
Leonard R. Kyle 
Department of Agricultural Economics 
Michigan State University 
For many years before 1945, few farmers were concerned about income tax 
rules. Very few paid any sizable amount of tax. Now that about 50 percent of 
farm production comes from farms which gross over $100,000, income tax manage-
ment as a part of financial accumulation is being developed into a real art. 
Production plans, growth strategy and investment planning can all be geared to 
methods of operation which help a farmer reach his financial objectives while 
using tax dollars to carry as much of the load as possible. 
Of course, the first fundamental is to put together a business operation 
which is fundamentally cost efficient. But then in order to avoid getting 
caught with high marginal tax rates, the second rule is to plan how to adjust 
present or new ventures to anticipated profits and taxes. Using dollars which 
would otherwise be paid as income tax offers a unique form of leverage which 
most farmers do not understand. 
This all begins with dynamics, or growth with perpetual debt. Tax re-
porting and most traditional thinking about ways of avoiding tax are usually 
confined to a single year. In that way the opportunity is missed of always 
pushing ahead larger expenses in anticipation of expansion, alongside relative-
ly lower income being realized in the current year. This is very easy to do 
as long as the cash basis of reporting is permitted. A dairy farmer who raises 
extra heifers thereby expands his herd without paying tax on his inventory 
accumulation. Ordinary crop production items bought ahead for an expanded 
operation the following year fall in the same general class. Also, buying big 
ticket machinery in the fall does the same thing in form of depreciation and 
that very beneficial item, investment credit. Small farmers who have little 
intention of expansion will wake up some day and insist that all farmers be 
put on an accrual basis. This will partially force paying tax each year on 
the income earned instead of allowing bunching of sales from carried-over in-
ventories or juggling expenses by time of purchase. 
An integral part of the tax advantage of continuous growth is the fact 
that borrowed money is tax deductible. particularly during times of rising 
land values, it is therefore quite desirable to keep equity levels at 50 per-
cent or less. This is not liked by people who have a value system which calls 
for paying debts as rapidly as possible. 
Both of the above ideas point to the advantage of continually buying 
land, especially where it is usable in a given business. The tax advantage is 
greatest if the land needs development to improve its productivity. This may 
call for draining, leveling, or even irrigation. If this can be timed to 
periods when a farmer falls in a high marginal tax bracket, tax dollars will 
go a long way toward creating a more valuable capital asset. The costs will 
have been offset as investment credit, depreciation, or just ordinary operating 
costs, if one is clever enough to do it gradually with regular farm machinery 
and hired labor. Some high bracket taxpayers have spent a lifetime in a land 
development and speculation business which is run in tandem with a profitable 
farm. 
Another feature of buying farm property as a tax shelter comes from the 
effect on cash flow resulting from book deductions which reduce the tax from 
other sources. A farm bought on a low down payment contract may have 25 to 50 
percent of the value assigned to IIdepreciable property. II The annual tax deduc-
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tions as depreciation can exceed the down payment and end up as a paper loss 
for tax purposes when, in fact, a sizable net cash balance is flowing into the 
owner's check book. He can then use this to make payments on the principal. 
All tax savings must be viewed on an annual basis. continuous delay is 
quite an advantage, especially during times when interest rates are 10 percent 
or higher. Money then doubles in only a little over 7 years. Also, with con-
tinual venturing, entrepreneurs sometimes make mistakes and encounter unprofit-
able years. Tax savings give them more leeway. 
33 
CONSEQUENCES OF INCOME TAX LAW AND 
REGULATIONS: ORCHARD DEVELOPMENT 
Hoy F. Carman 
Associate Professor of Agricultural Economics 
University of California, Davis 
Income tax provisions permitting current deduction of capital costs as-
' sociated with orchard, grove, and vineyard development provide a significant 
' investment incentive for those tree and vine crops exhibiting current net 
profits. The incentive is presently available to all developers of all orchard 
and vine crops except citrus and almonds. The value of the incentive can be 
SUbstantial and exists yhether the orchard is held for its productive life or 
sold for capital gains. For more than a decade the incentive has been packaged 
and successfully sold to nonfarm investors as a tax shelter. 
citrus and almonds were popular nonfarm investments until their tax 
shelter advantages were terminated by capitalization requirements which be-
came effective in 1970 and 1971. Investor interest quickly shifted to other 
perennial crops with a favorable economic outlook. These crops included 
wine grapes, avocados, walnuts, and kiwi fruit. Most observers agree that 
nonfarm investment (partially motivated by tax considerations) was an im-
portant factor in the recent rapid expansion of California wine grape acreage. 
However, with a large grape crop, static per capita consumption, and wine 
grape prices dropping to 25 to 40 percent of 1973 levels, investor interest 
has waned just as it has done in cattle feeding. 
Impact 
Since we are considering an area in which few data exist, we must use 
scattered observations and our theoretical tools to evaluate impacts. with 
this limitation, any conclusions are general and largely in terms of direction 
of i~f~uen2e rather than a quantitative estimate of the impact of a tax 
provl.sl.on. 
Income tax incentives, whether in livestock, orchards, or other activi-
ties, increase after-tax returns from investments in the "favored ll enter-
prises. The general effect of these incentives, while difficult to quantify, 
is to increase investment and ultimately production over the level which 
would exist without the incentives. In fact, several countries use income 
tax incentives to encourage agricultural development, through land reclama-
tion and development, crop establishment, and expansion of livestock numbers. 
Increased investment and expanded production-have a number of potential 
economic implications. 1111 briefly examine a few of these within a frame-
work emphasizing the supply and demand for inputs and outputs associated 
with orchard and vine crops. 
Inputs. Major inputs for the development of orchard and vine crops in-
clude land, labor, capital, management services, and nursery stock. The 
price impact of an increase in the demand for these inputs as a result of 
increased development is related to the amount of the input required and 
its elasticity of supply. This, of course, varies by crop and area. 
IBudgeted examples demonstrate that the increased present value of 
deducting development costs currently instead of depreciating them is about 
equal to the tax advantage of sale for capital gains. See HOY F. Carman, 
IITax Loss Agricultural Investments After Tax Reform, II Aller. Jour. of Agr. 
Econ., 54:4, Part 1, November 1972, pp. 627-34. 
2 The very limited number of quantitative estimates available tend to 
be based on budgeted examples rather than actual experience. The confidential 
nature of tax returns precludes detailed analysis by anyone other than 
Treasury Department researchers. 
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Previous work in the form of budgeted examples leads me to believe that 
the increased acreage of California orchard and vine crops due to tax in-
centives is a comparatively small percentage. The increase depends on the 
tax bracket of the investor and the crop but I believe 5hat for most crops 
it will range from zero to five percent of the acreage. Note that in a 
short period the proportion of new plantings due to tax incen4ives could be 
much higher. The above figures are for a long-run situation. 
Given a relatively small percentage increase in the total acreage of 
california orchard crops as a result of tax incentives, we can speculate on 
the impact of input prices. The requirements for capital and labor have been 
small relative to the total supply of these factors. There has probably been 
little or no increase in prices as a result of orchard development incentives. 
While the supply of land is limited, there is a large amount in California 
suitable for orchard development. Tax incentives have undoubtedly strengthened 
the overall level of prices of orchard land. They have definitely helped in-
crease prices of land for specialty crops requiring micro-climates and 
particular soil types. Included here is land suitable for avocados a~ 
premium varietal wine grapes. The increased demand for farm management 
services may have resulted in some increase in fees. The longer run impact 
is a definite expansion in the quantity and range of services offered. The 
nursery industry has undoubtedly benefited from increased prices and sales 
volume. It is worth noting that nursery interests have been involved in 
some of the large public tax shelter offerings to nonfarm investors. 
Product Prices. The incr~e in orchard plantings as a result of invest-
ment incentives and the impact of increased production on crop prices depends 
on the elasticity of tree planting and the price elasticity of demand for 
the individual crops. Total revenue to producers of crops with inelastic 
farm level demand will decrease; for crops with elastic demand, total revenue 
will increase. Previous rese~rch indicates that the farm level demand for 
most tree crops is inelastic. Thus, producers of orchard and vine crops 
receive a tax incentive but as a result of increased production they also 
receive lower product prices. Many producers will have lower total crop 
revenue as a result of the planting incentives. Their after-tax income as 
a result of incentives may be lower than without incentives. However, after 
an analysis of five California orchard crops we concluded that lIit appears 
that • • • benefits to growers as a group (including new entrants 6taking ad-
vantage of the tax subsidies) are positive for most commodities." However, 
there are orchard crops where producers as a group do not benefit. In ad-
dition, since the distribution of incentive depends on the income of the 
developer, individual producers may suffer even when the producer group bene-
fits. 
Research for the five crops mentioned above indicates that consumers 
have been the major beneficiaries of orchard development tax incentives. In-
creased production at lower per unit prices resulted in an annual gross 
social r~turn to consumers ranging from $0.12 to $15.00 per dollar of in-
centive. We had no evidence of the efficiency of the tax incentive versus 
other incentives which could achieve the same result. 
3Estimates for five California crops by tax bracket of the investor can 
be calculated from a previous article. If we assume that all developers were 
in the 50 percent tax bracket (probably higher than existed) the increased 
acreage would be: apples, 2.38 percent; apricots, 3.20 percent; avocados, 
6.48 percent; Freestone peaches, 1.75 percent; and olives, 0.14 percent. See 
Hoy F. Carman and James G. Youde, IIAlternative Tax Treatment of Orchard Dev-
elopment Costs: Impacts on Producers, Middlemen and Consumers, 11 AIDer. Jour. 
of Agri. Econ., 55:2, May 1973, pp. 184-191. 
4Another analysis in the form of a case study of five large California 
farms using a utility-maximizing risk framework found that farmers would 
Continued on Next Page 
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Thus far in the discussion we have not considered problems of the dis-
tribution of tax benefits, the relationship of agricultural and tax policy, 
adjustment problems associated with the orchard asset, and the impact of tax 
incentives on the structure of agriculture. It is these problems which are 
central to the controversy surrounding tax shelter investments in agriculture. 
Tax Incentive Problems 
All taxpayers have an interest in orchard development tax incentives but 
it is the participants who have the largest stake in the outcome of current 
discussions regarding possible limitations. The following problems relate 
to this producer group and to agriculture. 
Equity. It is doubtful that a government expenditure program based on 
agricultural policy requirements would distribute payments in the same pat-
tern as does the orchard tax subsidy. The subsidy program is open-ended 
with the largest subsidy going to the taxpayer with the highest taxable in-
come, whether from farming or other sources. 
Tax subsidies are hidden government expenditures. Given the pattern 
of payments, the orchard tax subsidy can only serve to reduce the progres-
siveness of our income tax structure. An alternative is a cash grant rather 
than a tax deduction or refund. If it were determined that the nation 
needed increased acreage of a particular orchard crop the government could 
pay the developer for 50 percent of qualifying expenditures. While this 
would be equivalent to allowing the 50 percent bracket taxpayer to write off 
costs, it has the attractive feature of equal subsidy regardless of other in-
come of the investor and it gets the amount of subsidy out in the open. 
policy. There is little evidence of any effort to coordinate national 
agricultural policy and income tax policy. Tax policy as it applies to 
agriculture has developed piecemeal and current discussions of possible 
reform tend to ignore agricultural policy. This is an unfortunate situation, 
especially when one considers that most possible tax law changes being 
discussed will influence agricultural investment. 
There are examples of present orchard tax policy which are directly op-
posed to other government programs. The most striking example is the de-
velopment subsidy available for cling peaches at the same time a state market-
ing order provides for tree removal and a green drop. 
It is often argued that nonfarm investors provide large amounts of 
capital not available from other sources. 11m not familiar with an ag-
ricultural credit policy which includes nonfarm investment. The govern-
ment did enact a loan guarantee program for cattle feeders when nonfarm 
investors lost both money and their interest in cattle feeding. As a 
source of funds, nonfarm investment may be here today and gone tomorrow. 
In addition, the cost of the funds must be questioned. Some organized in-
vestments allocate up to 40 percent of revenue for packaging the invest-
ment, real estate commissions, sales commissions to brokers, and administra-
tion. 
4~ Cont. 
reduce their acreage of tree crops by 16 percent in response to requir-
ing capitalization of development costs. See William Lin, H. F. Carman, 
c. V. Moore, and G. W. Dean, "Producer Response to Income Taxes: An Empirical 
Test within a Risk Framework, II National Tax Journal, 27:2, June 1974, pp. 
183-195. 
5For a summary of demand studies see western Extension Marketing Com-
mittee, Task Force on Price and Demand Analysis, A Handbook on the Elasticity 
of Demand for Agricultural Products in the united states, WEMC publication 
No.4, July 1967. 
6see Carman and Youde as cited in footnote 3, p. 190. 
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Adjustment. A long-run cycle of production and prices is a common 
phenomenon with most orchard and vine crops. Returns can remain high for 
several years even though acreage expands rapidly, since several years typi-
cally elapse between planting and first commercial production. I believe 
that orchard tax subsidies accentuate cyclical price and production patterns. 
The sUbsidy encourages over-allocation of resources when returns are favor-
able. Low prices as a result of over-production will tend to persist be-
cause of the fixed nature of the orchard asset. 
It was large plantings which led citrus and almond producers to re-
quest capitalization requirements for those two crops. I expect to hear 
similar requests in the not-too-distant future from California grape and 
avocado producers. Existing producers have ample reason to request capi-
talization requirements for their crops. Capitalization makes it more ex-
pensive to develop new orchards, thus slowing expansion. In addition, in-
creased development costs lead to higher values for existing orchards, 
especially young bearing orchards. 
The desirability of a partial approach such as requiring capitaliza-
tion for only citrus and almonds must be questioned. Investor interest 
immediately shifts to other crops. Concentrated interest is likely to 
lead to overplanting of these other crops. The shift to grapes and avocados 
in California is an example that comes to mind. 
structure. The possible impact of tax subsidized investments, particu-
larly those packaged and marketed as tax shelters, on the structure of agri-
culture is a source of controversy. Farmers have tended to have rather 
strongly held values concerning personal freedom, farming as a way of life, 
and the family farm. Many of the operating characteristics of tax shelter 
investments, whether conducted individually or through a limited partnership, 
are opposed to these values. These characteristics include increased con-
tract production and vertical coordination, absentee ownership, and cen-
tralized direction by investment managers and farm management companies. 
Existing farmers may be able, however, to more fully utilize their 
management skills and realize economies of size through their association 
with nonfarm investors. This also implies larger and fewer farms. 
Concluding Remarks 
Income tax incentives for orchard development have undoubtedly in-
creased the acreage and production of tree and vine crops. The impact 
of these increases has probably been a rise in price of land, especially 
land suitable for specialty crops such as avocados and premium wine grapes. 
The nursery business is probably larger than it would be without incentives 
and nonfarm investment has resulted in an increase in the quantity and 
scope of farm management services available. 
Producers mayor may not have benefited from planting subsidies. Here 
the subsidy must be balanced against decreased product prices. Consumers 
have benefited from lower prices but the hidden nature of the subsidy pre-
vents determination of its efficiency. Perhaps the same result could be 
achieved at lower cost. 
Problems associated with orchard development subsidies include the 
distribution of tax benefits, coordination of tax and agricultural policy, 
adjustment of fixed orchard assets, and possible impact on the structure 
of agriculture. Any discussion of tax law changes affecting orchard 
development needs to come to grips with these problems. 
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CONSEQUENCES OF INCOME TAX LAW AND REGULATIONS: 
THE STRUCTURE OF AGRICULTURE 
Lauren Soth 
Editor of the Editorial pages 
Des Moines Register and Tribune 
In our lifetime we have seen an earthquake of change in the structure 
of agriculture. The change has been so great that the nature of the industry 
and way of life have been altered. 
In 35 years, the number of farms has been cut by more than half. Many 
parts of the farming business of the 1930 l s have been taken off the farm and 
are now functions of what we call agribusiness: production of farm power, 
most seeds, fertilizer. 
New functions have been added, such as killing weeds by chemicals and 
vastly improved chemical control of diseases and insects. The materials come 
from off-farm business agencies and increasingly the actual work on the farm 
is done by them. 
In less than a half century there has been a greater change in American 
agriculture than in all the preceding century and a half of our national 
existence--and, perhaps, in a thousand years before that. 
The character of the industry is different. We donlt even know what to 
call farming any more. Is broiler production in industrialized setups farming? 
Is the California factory-of-the~field, producing fruits and vegetables, farming 
or something else? When agribusiness firms do everything from the soil 
preparation to the harvesting, what part is farming and what part nonfarm 
business? . 
We usually explain all this by the advance of technology, the application 
of science to agriculture. But today I want to mention another factor in 
recent years--taxation. 
Maybe you will say taxation also is a phase of the general revolution 
in technology which has led to urbanization~ more economic functions performed 
by specialized units, and more done by government. The old separation of 
private and public has been blurred. 
This means we pay for more things and services through taxes and less 
through direct purchases in the markets. 
The speed of the conversion of economic systems has brought unequal 
impacts and distortions. One of these, I think, is the effect of taxation on 
size and organization of farms. 
The modern society has been shifting rather rapidly from taxation based 
on property and unit levies (excises) on transactions to income levies, with 
varying (progressive) rates--the higher the income the higher the rate of tax. 
with agriculture going through such a metamorphosis, taxes have caused 
radical diversions in investment and allocation of resources. I have no idea 
what all these effects have been, and no one else does. But that they have 
been large, I am sure. 
The development of large cattle feedlots is not a consequence of mere 
technology. The cost studies I have seen show insignificant economies of scale 
beyond a unit of 500 head. The advantages of large-scale grain farming, wheat, 
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corn, soybeans or other enterprise, are fully realized by much smaller units 
than many of those which have been put together in recent years. 
something other than technology has been acting as a force toward larger 
scale. Spreading of improved management over bigger production and marketing 
units undoubtedly is a main reason. But taxes also seem to be an important 
part of it. 
A recent study for the Treasury by a couple of young economists, Robert 
Evenson and Finis Welch, carries implications of this. They found enormous 
differences among areas of the country in the incidence of the federal income 
tax on farming. 
Middlewest states with high proportions of family farms of moderate size 
pay much larger income taxes in relation to income than do Southern, Far West 
and coastal states. 
In the four years 1967 through 1970, Iowa, Illinois, Nebraska, and North 
Dakota, with 19 percent of the net farm income as computed by USDA, paid more 
than 40 percent of the nation's farm income tax. 
California, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia and South 
Carolina together also had 19 percent of the national farm income. They paid 
less than 2 percent of the farm income tax. 
The Internal Revenue Service figure on taxable fann profits amounted to 
30-50 percent or more of the USDA farm income figure in the North Central 
States, whereas it was only 3-20 percent in most of the other states. 
The Internal Revenue Service profit figure is much smaller than the USDA 
figure for net income partly because of the capital gains factor. Income from 
appreciation of assets has amounted to about 40 percent of net farm income in 
USDA figures. This largely escapes taxation, according to Evenson and Welch. 
I am not going into that question. For my purpose here, it is the 
difference in ratios for different types of farming that is important. 
In Iowa, the highest percentage state, the figure was 53, and in Arizona 
and New Mexico, it was 3 percent. Missouri had 30 percent. 
The exceptions to the general regional differences also are revealing 
from the viewpoint of size of farm and the nature of the farming business. 
Washington, New York, and Michigan all had relatively higher proportions of 
taxable income, and they also have a considerable number of small and general-
type farms. 
You might expect that federal income taxation would give an advantage 
to small farmers as compared with large farming businesses. Farm-produced 
food and fuel and rental value of homes are largely not taxed. These non-
money sources of real income are more important for family farms than for the 
bigger farms. 
But the comparison made by Evenson and Welch indicates that the tax 
advantage is with the big operations. 
With the cash accounting privilege, of course, farm firms can deduct 
against current income, expenditures for land development, soil conservation, 
irrigation and other capital outlays. This permits building up assets without 
paying taxes, or, in effect, an interest-free government loan. 
I don't have the facts to say what all may be involved in the difference 
in tax liability of farming in different areas. But it does seem to me that 
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AN INCOME TAX POLICY FOR AGRICULTURE 
Charles Davenport 
Professor of Law 
University of California, Davis 
Before considering kinds of changes one might look for in agricultural 
tax law, let us review briefly what the present law does and its consequences. 
I will use two simple examples. Let us start with the easier case which 
presents the deferral benefit. A farmer on the cash method of accounting 
does not use inventories. Thus, let us suppose that a calf is born during 
the year and by the end of the year $100 worth of feed is in that animal. 
To arrive at a proper commercial accounting and tax accounting concept of 
income most businesses with that kind of asset on hand would have to inventory 
the asset and reduce the costs and expenses of the year by $100. Farmers 
do not do that. Consequently, for this $100 cost that is in the calf at the 
end of the year, if there were no other farm income there would be a $100 
farm loss. Let us assume that the person has other income and is in the 
70 percent tax bracket. Then that farm loss will have, when the income tax 
return is filed, a value of $70 as tax deduction. 
It may be that at some time in the future the animal will be sold and 
the $100 will come back into income. The tax will then be paid on it be-
cause the asset will have a zero basis, as no costs were capitalized with 
respect to it. Consequently, when the animal is sold, and let us assume it 
is sold for $100, $70 in taxes will have to be paid. However, the taxpayer 
will have had the use of the $70 for a one or two year period. It is really 
an interest free loan from the Federal Government. That is the deferral 
benefit. 
There is another benefit which can be called an exemption benefit, nega-
tive income tax, or something of that nature. Going back to the same example, 
if the animal can be sold at capital gain rates, only one half of the sales 
price will be taken as income. Again assuming that it is sold for $100, 
that would mean that but $50 would be taken into income. A 70 percent tax 
bracket applied to that $50 would give a tax detriment at the point of sale 
at $35. Since the tax benefit taken when the feed was written off was $70, 
the tax detriment on the sale is only $35. The net difference is $35 and 
that is just as good as any $35 check the U. S. Treasury could write you. 
This has been described in various ways. I personally like to refer to it 
as the negative tax benefit. 
Let me say one thing more about the two primary kinds of benefits that 
are available because of the farm tax rules. We generally focus on farm 
losses. That is a mistake. The farm loss problem, if we can put it that 
way, is only the most visible part of the problem; and some people are not 
happy just to look at farm losses but talk about syndicated farm losses and 
things of that nature. A syndicated farm loss is just a way of breaking up 
farm assets so that you can put the tax loss in some individuals and other 
attributes of ownership and management in some other individual. The prob-
lem really is not one of farm loss. It is a problem that extends across the 
entire farm economy. If you are talking about crop farming, the major ad-
vantage for a crop farm of all these rules is merely to decide which year in 
which a certain income or expense is to be recorded for tax purposes. That 
is, if there is other income you might hold your wheat crop over into January 
rather than sell it in the prior year, to put off the income until the follow-
ing year. On the other hand, another technique might be to prepay or post-
pone expenses until such time as they would give a better benefit. But 
largely speaking, that is all there is for field crop farmers -- I am not 
thinking of nut and fruit and vine crops. The major benefits for field 
crop farmers might be called do-it-yourself averaging technique. 
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The deferral benefit and negative tax benefit are not limited to but 
are largely found in livestock, breeding cattle, cattle feeding, horse rac-
ing, and fruit and nut crops. 
Proposals 
The question next arises, what kinds of proposals could be made to deal 
with the problems? I will start with what I think is the proper solution, 
and talk about some of its issues and difficulties. 
A proper solution is really a four point program. The first would be 
to require, across-the-board for all people, full inventorying including 
that for feed and supplies. If you are not willing to bite the bullet on 
that I think you can forget about ever getting any effective legislation 
in this area. The second step would be the extension of the holding period 
for some assets required for them to fall within section 1231, and 
potentially result in capital gain. That is simply because, given the 
nature of animals and the uses to which they may be put, the present hold-
ing period allows ambiguousness about the purpose for holding. It requires 
some longer holding period to decide whether these assets really are being 
used in the business or are being held for sale. 
The third proposal would be to require full cost capitalization during 
the pre-productive period. That has to do with the growing vineyard and 
walnut orchard, kiwis, and the like. 
Fourth and last, let us repeal the present complex provisions such as 
EDA, section 1252 and 183. They do not help and they are either accountants' 
and lawyers' nightmares or dreams, depending on your point of view. 
A number of criticisms have been offered relative to changing to accrual 
accounting. The first is that it is too difficult for the average farmer. 
I think that is based on some belief that farmers are of subaverage in-
telligence. There are a lot of techniques that can be applied to even the 
smallest of farmers. But the truth of the matter is that farming today is 
not a small enterprise. I do not have at my fingertips the statistics on 
the size of farms, but the size of the average farm is growing greatly, and 
it seems ridiculous to suggest that an enterprise that may have $200,000 
worth of capital resources cannot afford to hire an accountant. And despite 
all the argument about techniques not being available, farm accounting books 
have been written since 1731. Furthermore, it is quite clear that for credit 
needs, farmers are doing this now anyway. You cannot walk into a bank and 
get a loan on the basis of a cash accounting statement. The banker will 
laugh at you if he is a good banker, and if he is not a good banker he 
probably will not be in the business very long. 
A second argument raised about this solution is that it would strike 
down or take away the inducement to bring in outside capital, and the farm 
sector would be damaged. That is really an argument for the economists; 
but it is always the argument of the person who has the advantage at the 
particular moment. Farms in this country have always needed outside capital; 
I am sure they did back as far as the Civil War, and they got it without a 
tax system that fed money to them in the way that I have described. 
Further, if we are devoted to free enterprise, why not let the free en-
terprise market decide whether or not the capital would be induced into an 
industry? 
The third argument raised is that there may be some difficulties in the 
years of transition, when a farmer has to change from a cash accounting 
method to an accrual or inventory method. That is a technical problem that 
could be worked out, as by an extended period of transition. 
The fourth and perhaps most telling argument against this solution is 
that it would not be effective. That argument is made by a good friend of 
mine who practices in Corpus Christi, Texas. He says that all of this would 
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not be effective because the present inventory methods would not result in 
deferring the expensing of adequate amounts. The answer to this is that 
once inventory accounting were required we could ask the question as to what 
the proper inventory method might be. We could then revise the technical 
rules. 
I think there is no question that the approach I have sketched here is 
the proper solution. Indeed, in my opinion it is the only solution. 
Adding New Limits 
The other route, of adding on still more limits and exceptions, is like 
telling my four children they can fight but be careful not to get hurt. 
When we start creating exceptions, we are trying to keep from hurting some-
body. The consequence is to add still more complexity. And the more specific 
the exception, the more complex the law. 
Further, going that route gives the legislature an opportunity to get 
off the hook and to tell you that it has done something when in fact it 
has not. 
Many of these so-called solutions are what I would call limitations on 
the use of farm losses. The proposals are legion. I will mention two very 
briefly, and state what I believe to be the theory on which they are premised. 
One would have allowed a complete deduction of farm losses if the non-
farm income did not exceed $20,000. If the nonfarm income were more than 
$20,000, the loss would have been trimmed to $10_000, I think by being 
phased step by step down to $10,000 as nonfarm income increased up to prob-
ably $40,000 or so. The theory of this bill, it seemed to me, was to define 
a farmer as one who has limited nonfarm income, and then to confine the use 
of the so-called farm accounting rules to that person. This again was an ef-
fort, rather than to correct a bunch of skewed rules, to save those rules for 
people who are sometimes called Illegitimate farmers. II This approach would 
leave an advantage for one who has farm gains as well as farm losses, and he 
could continue to use these rules to his advantage and to defer taxes in a 
continually expanding operation. 
Then there was the Senate Finance Committee version of the farm bill in 
1969. It is worth mentioning because its theory was different. If a tax-
payer had nonfarm income of $50,000 and a farm loss of $25,000, then the 
loss in excess of $25,000 would have been limited to ordinary farm income 
plus half of the deductions in excess of $25,000. Now the theory of that 
proposal was that capital gain is the difficulty in the farm area. By dis-
allowing half of the deduction the bill was really attempting to say, "since 
the income which these deductions will produce will be only one-half taxed, 
then the deductions should be allowed only to the extent of one-half. II It 
seems to me that that theory does not explain all the difficulty with the 
present farm tax rules. 
A number of other solutions are available. Senator Metcalf had one in 
1969 that was basically a limitation on the use of farm losses. Its theory 
was very close to that of the first proposal I mentioned above. Common to 
nearly all these proposals is the right to deduct any amount of farm loss, 
against any kind of income, if proper accounting rules were used. 
That provision was put in in order to take care of the person who says, 
IIGee, but my loss is an economic loss and is not an artificial loss induced 
by these tax rules which apply only to agriculture." 
In April 1973 the administration offered a proposal, LAL (limitation on 
artificial accounting losses). A limitation on artificial losses is also 
a restriction on the use of farm losses. It was, however, to operate only 
on the amount of the loss that comes from the artificial accounting rule. 
So it would operate only on the artificial losses. Under the most recent 
proposal, if I understand it correctly, the right to deduct certain expenses 
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would be limited -- the artificial deductions (which will be defined later 
on) would be limited to total farm income and nonfarm income if the nonfarm 
income did not exceed $20,000. For each dollar of nonfarm income in excess 
of $20,000, the deductible farm loss would be reduced by one dollar. At 
$40,000 of nonfarm income, all artificial deductions (as defined by this 
proposal) in excess of farm income would be disallowed. Again, another 
simple solution! Disallowed deductions which could not be taken concur-
rently under this proposal could be carried over against farm income in 
future years. 
The artificial deductions as defined by this proposal were prepaid sup-
plies to be consumed in a later period; prepaid feed as we talked about 
yesterday; the pre-productive expenses for orchards, vineyards, and similar 
operations, but not for breeding livestock; and prepaid interest. Those 
were the artificial deductions. 
There were a number of difficulties with this solution. The inclusion 
of prepaid feed seemed to be aimed only at cattle feeding operations. I do 
not think there could have been much argument with that, because it was an 
effort just to reach cattle feeding operations that were largely syndicated. 
The inclusion of prepaid interest, and even more of prepaid feed, amounts to 
attacking a problem that largely did not exist; because, at least with re-
spect to interest, the Internal Revenue Service through its rulings has done 
a fair job in the prepaid interest area. 
As to the pre-productive expenses, incurred with orchards, vineyards, 
and other assets of that nature, they are not defined# and some persons be-
lieve that pre-productive expenses would not include labor, depreciation, 
and general overhead. If you would accept that, I do not know what you are 
left with. Is there anything? Maybe a little fertilizer, the cost of water; 
and those would be the only artificial deductions. So obviously a lot of the 
expenses would not be reached. Hence, many of the major expense items would 
not be reached by that proposal. 
Given all of those difficulties with the proposal, it is clear that the 
applications of the bill would not have been wide, and in my mind there is 
doubt that there is any improvement over what we have. You cannot even say 
that it is simpler than what we have. 
There were some other features of the proposal. I might run quickly 
through those. 
Corporations, other than the family corporation and subchapter S cor-
porations, would be required to use the accrual accounting and inventory 
methods of accounting. I believe that it would require full cost capitaliza-
tion of the pre-productive period expenses. A family corporation, as one 
that is excused from using the accrual and inventory methods of accounting, 
would be a corporation where 75 percent of the voting and 75 percent of all 
the stock is owned by a family consisting of brothers, sisters, ancestors, 
descendants, or the estate of the taxpayer. It is interesting how we continue 
to create new definitions and new attribution rules, in effect attributing 
ownership among taxpayers. 
Another fork of the proposal is that where breeding (dairy or sporting) 
livestock were involved, the deduction for losses would not be allowed in 
excess of the amount of capital an individual had at risk. Because it was 
specifically stated there was no risk to the extent of non~recourse 
loans -- and I quote or paraphrase because I do not quite understand this 
there is no risk to the extent the taxpayer will be reimbursed for a loss 
where he had a stop-loss order, a guaranteed repurchase, insurance, or 
similar arrangement. Now I do not know what that means. DO they really 
mean insurance? I do not know. Because there are lots of kinds of in-
surance -- what kind of insurance? Anyway, the effort was to list, to limit 
the deductions, not to allow the leveraged deduction if you will. I think 
that in the cattle feeding area, this would be acceptable to cattle feeders. 
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I want to spend a few minutes evaluating this proposal, because it is 
the one which has been tentatively adopted by the Committee on Ways and 
Means, and I suppose it is the one which is going to receive the most at-
tention. The only really positive feature I can find about it is the re-
peal of EDA -- and I do not believe it goes so far, however, as to repeal 
section 1252 as well. 
Secondly, it is another complex set of provisions, which would be sub-
stituted for an already complex law. And complexity is the price we pay to 
preserve a tax shelter for some while trying to put others out into the cold, 
harsh weather of the graduated income tax. At least in its present form, 
the coverage of the proposal -- Who is covered? When does it apply? How 
does it apply? is far from certain. Also, the proposal is most in need of 
amplification because, for instance, in the pre-productive expense area, 
the kinds of expenses that would be picked up for some crops would differ 
substantially from the kinds of expenses that would be picked up for other 
crops. There is no reason to differentiate on that level. Furthermore, 
tree and plant crops receive treatment different from livestock. The risk 
rules for livestock are at odds with the rules applicable to other shelters 
such as oil and real estate. I have some difficulty with agplying these 
kinds of risk rules in the farming industry when they do not apply in oil 
and real estate. It is pretty clear that leveraged investment is the thing 
which makes the oil tax shelters and many of the real estate tax shelters 
go round. 
You should also note that, at least to some extent, these provisions 
will force some people to take an inventory or do something of that nature 
in order to decide what supplies they have on hand at the end of the year: 
to decide what part of their expenses for the year are artificial expenses. 
It is interesting that that is going to be required because the major argu-
ment, other than the economic argument, against the use of proper accounting 
has been that inventories could not be taken. If you accepted that argument 
at face value, Congress would be requiring that which it has consistently 
said could not be done. Furthermore, there is an assumption in this solution 
that the problem lies in farm losses, in the use of farm losses against non-
farm income. But it does not face up to the fact that the real problem is 
the deviation from good accounting methods. I think the assumption on which 
the proposal is built is wrong. Except for perhaps some few livestock opera-
tions, the proposal will affect so few operations that it may properly be de-
scribed as a hoax, or at least a gimmick designed to fool the public while 
pacifying those whose ox would have been gored by effective changes. We did 
that in 1969, and we are working up to it again in 1975, I guess. It is just 
another non-reform bill that only makes things more complex. 
Conclusion 
In concluding my remarks, I think that one must decide what his values 
in life are, and even though you may, in your own particular situation, be 
gaining some small or some large advantage out of the present accounting 
rules, if you really want to take care of this problem you should get back 
to what the proper solution is. If you do not, there is going to be continual 
tinkering, complexity, outrage, instability, and probably Congressional 
action. Because the benefits, even under any of the proposals I have men-
tioned, are still so great that the public is going to be aware of them, and 
there is going to be a lot of visibility to their use. If you are looking 
for stability, what you should do is get hold of your Congressman, and tell 
him you do not want any more of these gimmicks, and tell him you want the 
right solution, NOW. You will get at least some stability for a substantial 
time in the future. If you could get the right solution written into the 
law, it would be my guess that it would be very difficult for special in-
terests in the future to start carving out exceptions. 
with that I conclude. 
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AN INCOME TAX POLICY FOR AGRICULTURE 
J. Carroll Bottum, Professor-Emeritus 
Purdue University 
Our federal income tax system has three objectives: (1) to raise revenue, 
(2) to redistribute wealth, and (3) to encourage or discourage certain activ-
ities in our society. The graduated federal income tax schedule is an example 
of the first two objectives and the child deduction features and the liquor 
and tobacco taxes are examples of the third. Therefore, to use the federal 
tax to encourage the kind of society we want is an accepted concept and now 
practiced. 
Last year at this conference I emphasized a point which I wish to allude 
to briefly again. It is that we all have varying productive capabilities as 
a result of our environment and heredity. Thus, if we reward people on their 
productivity, we get a wide variation in incomes. However, we put considerable 
emphasis in our society on justice and equality. We also know that if every-
one's income is the same, productivity tends to fall to the level of the least 
productive. Thereby, everyone has less. Thus our continuing problem is to 
find that mix of rewards that keeps production up and also provides some 
justice in the distribution of income. This concept must be kept in mind as 
we consider changing the tax laws that affect farm producers. 
Furthermore, we should not approach this problem as though we were try-
ing to "get" someone who ought to have paid taxes but didn't. We are rather 
asking the question, if tax laws were changed, would they encourage the society 
or system that more people think is desirable? 
It has often been said that an old tax is a good tax or old tax is no 
tax. The meaning is that in both cases economic adjustments and expectations 
have previously been made to the tax. It is changes in taxes which bring a-
bout many inequities. Therefore I would suggest some advance warning or de-
lay be provided in the effective date for any changes, and that the number of 
changes be kept as few as would accomplish the objective. 
Fortunately, no important national revenue issues are involved in the 
changes being suggested at this conference. 
About three years ago a task force was set up in the colleges of agricul-
ture to analyze the issue of who is going to control agriculture. Following 
preparation of background material we held discussions at a number of regional 
meetings around the country. Among other things three issues were consistently 
raised by producers: (1) how can we keep open markets for agricultural pro-
ducers, (2) how can we get our supplies at competitive prices, and (3) how can 
we adjust our tax laws so that the wealthy individual or organization entering 
farming does not have an advantage tax-wise over the typical farmer? It seems 
to me these are important and worthy issues that should be considered. At 
this conference we are considering the third issue. 
An analysis of the data indicates that while, for the major farm commod-
ities the individual commercial farmer is competitive in farm production, the 
changes which have taken place on the input side of farming and on the market-
ing side, as well as the tax situation, have put many economic pressures on 
the independent farmer today. 
When this country was founded, there was much debate whether the land 
was to be distributed in large blocks to corporations and plantations or to 
family farmers. Those who favored the family farm land pattern won out. The 
government supplemented this pattern of farming by the Homestead Acts, the 
establishment of the Land-Grant Colleges, and much other legislation. 
45 
The march of technology has brought this question before us again. I be-
lieve as Kenneth Boulding has said, "Once man has worshipped at the tree of 
knowledge there is no going back. rr We must learn to ride the new technology. 
It does not mean, though, that we have to be victims of it in our economic and 
social structure. Man can shape his social and governmental destiny now just 
as he did in the founding days of this nation. 
In this day and age when we are trying to give meaning in our industrial-
ized society to the individual's dignity and work, it seems questionable that 
we should move independent farming into the same centralized control pattern. 
It would be particularly undesirable to move farming in this direction because 
of artificial rather than real economics in the tax, supply and marketing areas. 
Now, as has been previously said at this conference, the principal tax 
opportunities for the wealthy and the large organizations arise from provisions 
that (1) delay payment of tax, or (2) reduce the tax rate through capital gains. 
In regard to the delayed payment issue, it would seem that consideration 
should be given to the proposal of limiting all farm losses to nonfarmers to 
some modest figure for anyone year. Where the production facilities are 
owned, the limit might be higher than otherwise. Disallowed losses could be 
carried forward with no limit on years or amount. The opportunity to shift to 
the accrual method should be kept available, and should be required for non-
farm operators with gains or losses from farming above $10,000 per year. 
Orchard crops could all be treated in the same manner as citrus and almonds 
now are. 
These changes should limit the large in and out livestock feeder and 
land developer from shifting his 'income from one year to another. It should 
not greatly disturb the small part-time farmer from reporting his losses. 
Some escape clause might be included for the large nonfarmer when a crop or 
livestock disaster occurs. 
With regard to capital gains, it would seem that those from livestock 
might be limited to 15 percent or thereabouts of the total sales from anyone 
class of livestock for any year. This would not seriously discriminate against 
the regular hog producer who markets part or all his sows each year under the 
capital gains procedure. It would allow in .most cases for the selling of some 
livestock for breeding purposes, where the producer was not a regular producer 
of breeding animals. 
After 10 years in the business of producing any class of livestock the 
individual might retire and obtain the same capital gain privileges that exist 
under present regulations. This would not discriminate against the regular 
producer. Perhaps an undue hardship or disaster clause should be included to 
take care of special situations where individuals are forced out of business. 
During periods of sustained land appreciation and anticipated apprecia-
tion, nonfarm capital tends to be drawn into land purchase partly because of 
the greater savings to high income individuals or groups from the capital gains 
opportunity. There does not seem to be a simple way to handle this issue. It 
raises the question of what our land use policy should be. This whole area of 
land use policy deserves further study. 
As has been said in North Central Regional Extension Publication 32, 
"to whatever extent subsidized investment raises the price of basic resources 
in farming, whether it is' the price of land or equipment or breeding (or 
;feeding) stock, the subsidized investors gain a competitive advantage over all 
those who get less subsidy or none at all. In this way, rules for tax deduc-
tions and·concessions have much to do with who is going to control U. S. agri-
culture in the future. II 
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Summary 
Limiting the use of farm tax losses in anyone year and confining capital 
gains in the case of livestock to use by farmers in their normal operations 
would go a long way toward equalizing the advantages that nonfarm investors 
now have over traditional farmers. They would not require major changes in 
the federal farm tax system or seriously change the typical farmer's situation. 
They would decrease the opportunity of the nonfarm investor to enter farming 
because of special tax savings. 
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AN INCOME TAX POLICY FOR AGRICULTURE 
w. Fred Woods* 
Economic Research Service 
United States Department of Agriculture 
As a prelude to our discussion, let me do two things: Give a brief 
historical perspective of our Federal income tax and cover some of the general 
requirements for a Ilgood" tax structure. 
The U. S. income tax is now 61 years old. A large faction of the 
Congress in 1913 favored imposition of the tax at a flat rate (initially 1%). 
Another faction demanded a graduated rate combined with large exemptions. 
The late Champ Clark of Missouri assured the House of Representatives that 
the "wit of man" had never derived a tax more fair or just than one with rates 
based on the ability to pay. Opponents expressed the fear that the proposed 
tax with its low rates was just the COWlS nose under the fence; that once an 
income tax was enacted, its rates would tend to rise. Senator Borah of Idaho 
was outraged by such anxieties and derided a suggestion that the rate might 
eventually climb as high as 20 percent. Who, he asked, could impose such 
socialistic, confiscatory rates? Only Congress. And how could Congress, 
repre~entatives of the people, be so lacking in fairness, justice, and 
pa tr iotism? 
That 1913 Law was enacted, as we all know too well. Its provisions were 
set forth on 26 printed pages and the instructions for the original Form 1040 
required but one page. Today the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code run 
to several thousand pages and the booklet of instructions to the individual 
taxpayer contains 30 pages, with frequent suggestions that the taxpayer also 
consult supplemental materials. 
The complexities that have been introduced into the income tax law by 
Congress, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Courts since 1913 have been 
prompted by one or more of the following motives: to gain additional revenue, 
to correct alleged inequities in the impact of the law on taxpayers, to 
influence the national economy, or to achieve some desirable social purpose. 
Thus, the United States tax system, like that of any other country, has develop-
ed in response to many influences--economic, political and social. One way 
it has not developed is that it has not been constructed by a master architect 
in line with the optimal requirements for a "good tax structure." Even so, 
ideas as to what constitutes a Jlgood" tax system have had their influence. 
The following are generally considered some ill the most important 
requirements for a "good" tax structure: 
(1) The distribution of the tax burden should be equitable. Everyone 
should be made to pay his "fair share." By equity we mean two 
things. First, that people with equal incomes should pay approxi-
mately equal taxes (vertical equity). Secondly, people with higher 
incomes should pay more taxes than people with lower incomes, or 
horizontal equity. 
(2) Taxes should be chosen so as to minimize interference with economic 
decisions in otherwise efficient markets. At the same time, taxes 
may be used to correct inefficiencies in the private sector provid-
ed they are a suitable instrument for doing so. But taxes should 
*Views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily 
represent those of the U. S. Department of Agriculture. 
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neither distort resource allocation nor skew income distribution 
except in conformity with national policy goals. 
(3) The tax structure should facilitate the use of fiscal policy for 
stabilization and growth objectives. 
(4) The tax system should permit efficient and non-arbitrary 
administration and it should be understandable to the taxpayer. 
(5) Administration and compliance costs should be as low as compatible 
with other objectives. 
These various objectives are not necessarily always in agreement and 
where they conflict trade-offs between them are needed. For instance, 
corrective use of tax policy ma~interfere with equity. 
Generally, taxes perform three functions: 
(1) To provide revenues to finance the necessary expenditures of 
governments; 
(2) To finance transfer payments such as social Security; and 
(3) To provide for the adjustment or redistribution of income and 
wealth. 
Generally speaking, it is my opinion that when we ask taxes to go beyond 
these functions we get into trouble. When we try to use the tax structure to 
provide business subsidies we introduce inefficiencies into the system. Such 
subsidies can be far better provided through other methods. Considerable 
speculation and circumstantial evidence exists that special farm tax provisions 
may have contributed, in part, to changes in farm structure in recent years. 
In effect, they have created a subsidy to a portion of the farming sector--
but not necessarily to farmers or farm operators. Major and unintentional 
distortions in farm and general resource allocation and income distribution 
can and possibly have resulted from income tax laws and rulings. 
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AN INCOME TAX POLICY FOR AGRICULTURE 
William A. Peterson 
Attorney, Marshall, Missouri 
Member Missouri House of Representatives 
I am very grateful to be invited to this seminar. This is a new ex-
perience for me. I was introduced to the bruising world of agricultural 
economics when I lost a bill overwhelmingly in committee concerning establish-
ing a family farm law. I am a farmer, born and reared on a farm. These issues 
of economics are extremely vital. 
My family farm bill was subjected to lots of criticism, much of it justi-
fied. And would you believe I had a problem defining a farmer? An overwhelm-
ing problem. I didnlt know what to do about it. Do you? The value of the 
family farm unit and ranch, if we can express it in those terms, may not mean 
anything under income tax rules now. Even before we had an income tax we had 
farmers. They are still out there, and a function is performed there. There 
is a value, and I hate to be terribly philosophical about this, but I believe 
it, that there is a value to what we say, even in an esoteric way, the family 
farm is, the family ranch is, and the values that it holds, not only as a 
viable economic producer of food and fiber but the values it has in the public 
interest in our rural areas--the small businessmen and banks it supports and 
the overall effect on quality in the rural areas. In the same way we donlt 
want all these rural people going to the city. The cities have no place for 
them. They have no jobs for them and they have no place for them to live. So 
there is a socioeconomic sense to this. When I hear professor Davenport talk 
and Dr. J. Carroll Bottum talk, I suspect they are not talking about the same 
thing. 
I had previously assumed that the result of our income tax regulations 
was intended. That shows you how naive I am. I had assumed that the results 
were intended and it disturbed me deeply that the inequities of the results 
were intended by someone. I retained this view even after I entered the 
Legislature. Realization comes late but it nevertheless comes. 
The overview that I have received here today, and I hope it will be 
assimilated and put out for public consumption, has highlighted what I believe 
the problems to be while raising other problBms, and I would be perfectly de-
lighted to get some of the answers that all of us seem to be probing for and 
have some difficulty in arriving at because the goals are not uniform. 
The small family farm as such probably really doesn't exist so much any 
more but the small family farmer does in the context I am talking about, and 
the investment from nonfarm high bracket investors certainly contributes to a 
boom and bust type of thing, as in oil and perhaps cattle feeding and the 
whole economy. But it's significant to those who feed cattle. It's significant 
to grain farmers. 
The broader sense of the corporate impact is an entirely different issue 
in my opinion although not unrelated to income tax. But the predatory type of 
tactics that arise out of overwhelming market position of vertically integrat-
ed and conglomerated corporations either through backward integration or for-
ward vertical integration is related yet a different problem. It probably 
cannot be handled entirely in our income tax law. The possible injury to 
market competition is supposed to be dealt with through our anti-trust laws, 
though they are rather ineffectively enforced at this time. 
So I do want to say that for whatever this means, I am a proponent of 
the family farm and ranch concept, but I sure don't know what to do about it. 
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SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND CHALLENGES 
Harold F. Breimyer 
Perry Foundation Professor of Agricultural 
Economics and Extension Economist 
Any discussion of the subject of how income tax laws and rules affect 
agriculture encounters the mental obstacle that haunts all teachers of 
economic policy. That obstacle is the human habit of individualizing policy 
actions. The person who does that looks at any law or regulation as it 
individually affects him, as though he lived off by himself and he alone were 
subject to it. 
This is the way some farmers look at income taxes. A farmer who cannot 
see beyond his own check book will beg for any and all tax concessions. That 
farmer will not understand that the same concession used by others may leave 
him no better off than before, and perhaps worse off. 
The roundabout collective effect of a tax can be sharply different from 
its initial individual effect. 
To put this principle more bluntly, a tax break for one man doesn't 
help him a bit if it helps his competitors even more. 
A third language for saying the same thing goes back to the Charles 
Wilson malapropism of twenty years ago. The former chairman of General 
Motors saw unity between the interests of that company and the country. Most 
of the U.S. public corrected the gentleman, declaring that what is good for 
General Motors is not necessarily good for the country. We can say that what 
is good for a cattle breeding operation, or cattle feeding, or orchard may 
not be good for cattle breeding generally, or all feeding or all orcharding, 
or the country. But the real punch line is that what appears good for a 
particular ranch, feeding enterprise, or orchard may not even be good for 
that ranch, feeder, or orchard when its general effect works all the way 
through the ranching, feeding, or orcharding industry and back to the indi-
vidual operation. 
At the beginning of this seminar we had a little trouble recognizing 
this principle, this obstacle to understanding the overall meaning of income 
tax rules to agriculture. Later, though, we got on track. We then discussed 
the collective consequences of income taxes applied to agriculture. 
Several Effects of Taxes 
We considered how taxes affect (1) productivity in agriculture, (2) 
stability, and (3) the broad concept of equity. The last, equity, had·over-
tones of the effect on the structural organization of agriculture. It in 
turn led to long and unresolved discussion on how to define a farmer, or a 
farm. 
With regard to productivity, it is almost axiomatic that any reduction 
of cost of production, including cost of finance capital, will add somewhat 
to productivity, though perhaps with a lag. One ironic twist, noted by 
several persons, is that the defense of increased productivity did not seem 
so convincing until very recently. Prior to the last couple of years much 
direct subsidy went to reduce gross farm product jon and give some support to 
prices of farm products. Many persons were concerned about over productivity. 
My vote goes to the thesis advanced by Professor Carman that tax rules 
add somewhat to production in favored industries but not to the extent of 
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great magnitude. Perhaps tax rules have contributed somewhat more to total 
beef production than to orchard output. When nonfarm investors rushed to put 
catt~e into feedlots the total volume of feeding may have increased a little, 
prices of feeder calves were pushed somewhat higher, and the price of beef to 
consumers was shaved a bit. professor Williams makes great claims for the 
effect of tax rules on volume of feeding but the expansion in feeding in his 
area of Texas was offset to some degree by reductions in parts of the Corn 
Belt. 
With respect to the effect of tax rules on instability, all I will do 
is vouch for the germaneness of the point. Jim Rhodes believes the effect is 
substantial. I have no better knowledge. I am sure the net effect is not of 
opposite nature, that is, toward more stability. But I am also pretty sure 
that just as cattle would get fed without the tax incentive, we would have 
instability without the tax rules. Cattle production and feeding were 
notoriously unstable before someone got clever in exploiting the fine print 
of IRS regulations. So I donlt have anything to add on this aspect. 
But insofar as tax shelter investment in cattle feeding makes it more 
unstab~e, as seems to have been the case the past two years, an interesting 
paradox arises. The tax deduction rules are sometimes defended, as Professor 
Williams told us, on grounds of the high risk in cattle feeding~ Insofar as 
sheltered financing adds to the risk, we come full circle. We then prescribe 
tax deductions to cure an ill they themselves contributed to. 
This is not far fetched. Some feedlot managers reportedly would favor 
a cutback in tax deduction rules so as to reduce the volatility in tax 
shelter investment. 
This conference put much stress on equity. probably the equity 
considerations arise from two basic facts. One is that all tax shelter de-
ductions from progressive income taxes are more attractive to the high 
bracket taxpayer (including high income farmers) than the lower bracket one. 
The second is that the tax loss feature of tax rules can convert an economic 
loss into a private gain. In cattle feeding, for example, an operation that 
on a dollars and cents basis loses money may nevertheless be profitable for 
an investor who can get enough tax savings from it. This latter instance may 
not be equitable for society and it absolu~ely creates inequity for feeding 
operations that lack a tax benefit. 
probably the most indisputable statement made at this seminar is that 
tax-loss-financed cattle feeding can crowd out feeding not financed with a 
tax shelter (subsidy). The same rule applies to any other farm enterprise 
that qualifies for a tax concession. 
There are other equity aspects. Tax laws in agriculture are by no 
means neutral among ways to organize agriculture. The cattle feeding example 
I have just referred to helps custom feeding and hurts farmer feeding. Tax 
rules tend to favor large size of farming operations, for the reason express-
ed by Fred Woods; namely, that high income people (who get the bigger tax 
breaks) tend to invest in the larger farm operations. 
Some regional discrimination is present. Corn Belt agriculture, 
particularly crop farming, has been affected only mildly by tax rules because 
its field crops do not lend themselves so well to tax loss financing or other 
income tax features. 
Because income tax rules can affect the structure of agriculture and 
thereby also, as Dr. Soth pointed out, the structure of the rural community, 
it is appropriate to define what kind of agricultural and rural community we 
want. We must do that before we set out to make any changes in tax law. 
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On the other hand, it is hard to know whether it is necessary to specify 
a structural goal in the language of tax law. Perhaps we can make choices as 
to desirable kind of taxes without incorporating language defining a farmer, 
or a farm, or a family farm, or whatever concept we want to use. Perhaps 
Soth's and Professor Bottum's idea of seeking something close to structural 
neutrality is all we can ask. Yet Bottum expressed confidence that a reason-
able definition of a farmer or a farm can be arrived at. 
The conference was not able to come to firm conclusions on this matter. 
Nor can I. 
Papers by Professor Davenport, Mr. Carlin, and Mr. Woods contain a 
wealth of detailed legal and statistical information, plus Woods' criteria 
for a sound tax policy. This can be referred to in the papers and will not 
be summarized here. 
Nor is it possible to capsulate all the proposals advanced as to a de-
sirable tax policy. However, they tended to fall into two classes. One 
would make drastic changes in existing law, including eliminating some of the 
present tax deductions. The other would be more cautious, only modifying the 
present law and putting on more limits, such as the maximum amount of de-
ductible loss in farming. Overall, the prevailing sentiment was to reduce the 
amount of tax subsidy financing of farming. There was confidence that finance 
capital is not chronically short, and that giving various kinds of farmers and 
farms an equal chance to compete would be a desirable goal -- perhaps a 
sufficient one. 
I find myself sympathetic. But I also warn against too glib acceptance 
of the principle of neutral tax laws. No tax law is totally neutral. Ours 
is a high tax economy, and all tax levies implicitly have side consequences 
that were not intended. 
This point of accidental or inadvertent consequences leads to my final 
point, and one that received much attention in the seminar. It relates to 
the almost hidden, unexposed nature of so much tax-deduction financing of 
agriculture. Basic tax laws are enacted with full exposure. Direct subsidy 
to agriculture and other sectors via appropriations is always in the public 
eye. But subsidy by means of deductions from nominal tax rates gets much 
less attention. 
Granted, Professor Williams may be correct when he declares that agri-
culture would get less total subsidy directly than it does indirectly, al-
though the size of past direct subsidies for price support and conservation 
partly refutes him. But our conference seemed to hold a consensus, and I join 
in it, that in the interest of making wise public policy for agriculture it is 
just as important to look into indirect subsidization by means of tax de-
ductions as into comparable subsidization done directly. In order to learn 
more about the deduction features of our income taxes and the sheltered 
investments they lead to, 55 persons came together for this seminar. This it-
self is an accomplishment, and promising of more attention to this important 
subject in the future. 
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Note: This talk, given during the seminar, was 
on a subject different from that of the seminar. 
THE WORLD POPULATION-FOOD BALANCE 
Douglas Ensminger 
President, Mid-Missouri Associated Colleges and Universities and 
Professor of Rural Sociology 
University of Missouri-Columbia* 
I view the world population-food balance today pretty much along the 
line of the Humpty Dumpty nursery rhyme: 
Humpty Dumpty sat on a walli 
Humpty Dumpty had a great falli 
All the King's horses and all the King's men 
Couldn't put Humpty together again. 
Although there is presently enough food to meet the immediate world 
needs providing it could be equitably distributed, the balance between enough 
food and not enough food for the decades ahead is in doubt. When population 
growth exceeds the food supply, as it seems certain to do, it is doubtful if 
"AII the King's horses and all the King's menll will be able to put the 
population-food ratio back in balance without traumatic world experiences. 
Major segments of the population may first die as a result of malnutrition and 
starvation. 
My re~ding of the population-food production trends leads me to conclude 
that it is no longer a question of, "Will world population growth exceed avail-
able food supplies?" but rather, "When will this occur?" I further conclude 
that because of the present close food margin in the world, and given the 
devastating effects adverse weather can play, the present population-food 
balance must be accepted as the greatest threat to the human race in this 
century. 
Many problems grow out of what is now accepted as a trend toward a world 
demand for food greater than the quantity available. For the U.S., we must 
first understand our own psychosis about food reserves. It is understandable 
that the American farmer, supported by farm organizations and the Senate and 
House Agriculture Committees, fears food held in reserve. We have lived 
through two decades of U.s. agricultural surpluses and we bear the scars. 
We face a worldwide educational task regarding the emerging world 
population-food imbalance. One could be either optimistic or pessimistic 
about the two recent U.N. world conferences on population and food. I, for 
one, saw gains in both conferences. Both contributed to world understanding 
of the magnitude, complexity, and crisis nature of the emerging population-
food imbalance. 
some of the more important statements coming out of the two U.N. 
conferences are: 
1) Population growth rates are the dominant cause of the emerging world 
food crisis. 
2) FAO forecasts that by 1985 the developing countries will have an 
annual market demand deficit of between 80 and 90 million tons of 
food. 
*Also Chairman, Committee pn World Population and Food of International 
Association of Agricultural Economists and FAO. 
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3) The U.N. estimates that there are a minimum of 400 million people in 
the world whose income is so low that they cannot purchase enough 
food to meet minimum nutritional needs. Mr. Robert McNamara, Presi-
dent of the World Bank, ups the U.N. figure to 800 million, or one-
third of the world's population. If you take the U.N. figure of 400 
million, the food required to meet the needs of the developing 
countries is estimated at 20 million tons a year. If you accept the 
World Bank's figure, the necessary imports to fill the poverty gap 
double to 40 million tons by 1985. When market demand is added, the 
deficit of annual food needs of the developing countries for 1985 is 
in the range of 100 mi~lion tons--more in a year of adverse weather 
and less in a good crop year. 
The procurement cost, to ·say nothing of physical handling 
problems, puts in question the advisability of thinking about meeting 
food needs of this magnitude from exports of the major food producing 
countries. While the three majors, the U.S., Canada, and Australia, 
will be under increasing pressure to supply the deficit, it seems 
clear that the bigger effort to close the food gap will have to come 
from the developing countries themselves. 
4) Highlighted by the recent U.N. World Food Congress is the need for 
the U.S. to formulate both agricultural and food policies which take 
into account the U.S. requirements, exports for world trade, and 
meeting humanitarian needs of the world community. 
5) Since the U.S. does not now have food surpluses, and domestic and 
foreign markets can in the future be expected to be greater than 
U.S. production, the world community must share the cost for buying 
and shipping U.S. food grains to Third World countries. 
6) The decision taken at the world Food Congress to set up a World Food 
Council under the U.N. to coordinate both food aid and investment 
funds for Third World agricultural development must be accepted as 
a significant first step. 
7) The developing countries have three alternative ways to increase 
agricultural production. They can bring more land under cultivation, 
increase acreage under irrigation, or step up yields per acre. 
There is sUbstantial acreage of potentially productive land in 
Africa and Latin America. To bring it under cultivation will take 
time and billions of dollars. Since high yielding varieties, 
especially of wheat and rice, require heavy fertilization and 
controlled irrigation, steps must be taken to increase the 
irrigated area. This too will take time and money. 
This leaves higher production per acre as the most feasible 
and least expensive method of increasing food prodxtion within the 
developing countries. The following comments are pertinent: 
a) The new high yielding varieties, fertilizer, and water 
technology apply only to the 12-15 percent of the world's 
agricultural land now irrigated. 
b) Given the world energy crisis, both fertilizer and power 
for agriculture will be short. Increased fertilizer prices 
are placing a heavy financial burden on the developing 
countries, making it mandatory that they cut back on their 
fertilizer imports. 
c) Agricultural technology for irrigated land is reasonably 
adequate, but .that oriented to uncertain and limited rain-
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fall is inadequate. 
d) Needed is an agricultural technology less dependent on 
costly inputs, and one that is human-labor-oriented for 
the major source of power. 
e) Many of the developing countries are critically short of 
agricultural technicians. For example, Tanzania, a 
country of 14.5 million people, has only 11 persons 
trained for agricultural research. 
f) Government agricultural policies are ill-chosen, and 
political commitments in support of agriculture are weak, 
in most of the developing countries. 
g) Few of the developing countries have passed and implemented 
land reform legislation favorable to the small farmers in-
cluding tenants and croppers. 
h) The institutional infrastructure serving agriculture is 
inadequate in all developing countries, and unfavorable 
to the small farmer. 
i) Despite current progress, few of the developing countries 
have strong, viable administrative infrastructures. 
j) The one factor that above all others has restrained agri-
cultural production in developing countries the past two 
decades is traditionalism and insecurity--the insecurity 
of the millions of small, decision-making farmers. The 
situation is likely to continue for the next two decades. 
We could list other relevant factors in the emerging population-food 
imbalance. Overall, as I analyze past decades of experience relating to agri-
cultural production and population in developing countries, my conclusion is 
that the world's food crisis is today more related to social, political, energy, 
and weather problems than it is to technological and economic factors. The 
world's population problem is social, economic, technical, and political. 
The past two decades of emphasis on ec.onomic growth and the introduction 
of Western technology, institutions, and II know-how II to Third World countries 
have brought the human race to the brink of disaster. A third of these 
people now live in dire poverty and millions face starvation as population in-
creases faster than food production. Given the magnitude of the food crisis, 
both immediate and long term, now is not the time for either the developing 
countries or the developed countries to blame each other for the policies 
the developing countries adopted with developed countries' aid. volumes could 
be written about who influenced whom as developing countries patterned after 
the West in industrialization, modernization of agriculture, and rural-urban 
migration. 
We know from the record that most of the Third World countries under 
colonial rule were concerned about the plight of their people, most of whom 
were poor and all of whom lived without hope for a better tomorrow. To assist 
the newly independent Third World countries President Truman's Point IV 
program was brought into being. In the beginning it was highly pragmatic, 
innovative, and strongly oriented to self-help, people-development programs. 
We bent over backward in not wanting to impose our values, our structures, 
and our ways of doing things. But both developing and developed countries 
changed their thinking dramatically as the U.S. interrelated its military 
assistance with economic aid, and aid increasingly became interrelated in turn 
with U.S. foreign policy. Then as the U.S. moved beyond "know-how" to the 
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financing of major development projects, we increasingly set forth criteria 
which we felt would provide the greatest economic return on investment. 
programs of substantial social overhead cost and long time payoff were viewed 
with disfavor. Many plans of developing countries were formulated with our 
built-in economic aid assumed, and their priorities were modeled after the 
west. 
India initially had a strong commitment to involve all the rural people 
in development and to see to it that all rural people benefited. But Nehru 
was not able to get his Congress party to pass legislation to make land and 
water equitably available to all India's cultivators. India's administration 
was excessively bureaucratic, highly rigid, and unbending in opposing decentrali-
zing decision-making. Institutions were tightly controlled by the elitist, 
and institutions functioned to ~erve the elitist. 
Increasingly, pressures mounted within India as well as from the aid-
giving countries to place greater emphasis on industrialization and modernizing 
of agriculture. 
It is not enough to point up the negative. Needed are answers. What 
policies, programs, and strategies have worked? All the developing countries 
of the world are now confronted with the hard choices. 
I have a vivid memory of the early fifties when there was a great deal 
of speculation about which of the world's two most populated countries--China 
or India--would have the greater success in raising the level of living of 
their large populations. Which country would raise enough food for its 
people--democratically committed India, or China with its commitment to 
communism? 
I remember as clearly as if it were yesterday a 1951 meeting when the 
late Paul Hoffman, then president of the Ford Foundation, told me that the 
Ford Foundation's interest in assisting India was to help India succeed in 
using democratic methods to improve the level of living of its poverty-ridden 
people. He added that he saw no hope for world peace unless the masses of 
poor people could be fed and helped to live better. 
So the great experiment was under way. Democratic India committed her-
self to rural development, with three objectives--to involve all the people, 
to improve the level of living of all the people, and to make the country 
self-sufficient in food. 
China, with early assistance from Russia, emphasized industrialization, 
following the Russian model of big industries. 
Over the past 25 years India shifted to an emphasis on industrialization, 
including a more technological agriculture. 
China's political emphasis shifted to integrated rural development 
through communes, having as its objective involving all the people with built-
in assurances that all would be beneficiaries. Under the communes, land and 
water are equitably available to all the people. 
Today, after 25 years, the facts support a conclusion that China's 650 
million peasants have achieved food enough, employment, health, and education 
for all, and a new sense of security never before known to them. 
India's 580 million people currently have a food deficit of between nine 
and twelve million tons. And, 40% of its rural people and 50% of its urban 
people live in poverty, lacking the income to provide a minimum nutritional 
diet. 
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India was the first developing country to have family planning programs. 
But India has yet to make a political commitment to family planning. For the 
40 percent of India's people living in poverty, having children to look after 
parents in old age is a value which limits participation in family planning. 
India's population is increasing by about 13 million annually. 
While China spoke against family planning in the recent U.N. population 
Conference, China is deeply concerned about population growth. The first-born 
child is looked on with high favor, the second is accepted. Beyond two 
children, couples face political disfavor. 
In my concluding that the most basic "hang-ups" confronting the develop-
ing countries' task of increasing agricultural production are social, political, 
energy and weather problems rather than economic and technological problems, 
I want to emphasize strongly that technology and agricultural policies, inclu-
ding marketing guarantees, are essential. But my point is that you can have 
the technology, inputs, and guaranteed prices and still the small, subsistence, 
traditionally-oriented farmer will continue in his traditional ways. 
Decisions in the Third world to accept or reject improved agricultural 
technology will be made by some 300 million small, subsistence, survival-
oriented farmers. They place a higher value on meeting their families' sub-
sistence needs, and on following traditional practices with a sense of 
security, than on increasing production to meet national needs. 
Weather, though always an influence on agricultural production, will 
increasingly be a major factor in who will eat and who will starve. So long 
as the u.S. had surplus food grains the world could count on, it didn't 
greatly matter when weather had a 7 percent negative influence on agricultural 
production. But when the margin of food is narrow a 7 percent to 10 percent 
drop in production will be the difference between life and death for millions 
of people. 
The world's spotlight is on the U.S. in a more intense way than at any 
time in our nearly 200 years of statehood. The way we respond in helping the 
developing countries examine their alternatives and evolve new strategies for 
solving the population-food crisis will determine whether or not the 40 per-
cent of the world's population now living in poverty are to face slow death 
through starvation. 
If it is peace we seek above all else, we are likely to find that food 
enough for all will be the key to peace. 
The challenge was never greater than it exists today for the u.S. to 
join the world community in evolving a food system to produce, market, dis-
tribute, and feed all the world's people. 
The manner and sense of urgency in which all nations join in formulating 
and carrying out a world food system will, for the decades ahead, determine 
who will eat and live, and who and how many will be malnourished and die of 
starvation. 
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